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Structure of the dissertation 
 
The object of analysis of this doctoral thesis is the managerial dimension of multilevel 
governance. The research, composed by three papers aims to pass in a gradual way through 
different stages of methodological knowledge. Indeed, the perspectives chosen are grounded 
in three streams of thought: Positivism, Realism and Critical Realism.  
The typology includes a literature review, a quantitative and a qualitative analysis. The 
mechanisms observed are: multilevel governance (MLG), inter-governmental relations (IGR) 
and translation (or translability as pointed out by Rose and Miller, 1992).  
The first work ‘A managerial vision on multilevel governance and inter-governmental 
relations: a literature review’ focuses on the literature highlighting the managerial 
mechanisms of MLG. In particular, it explores the overlapping definitions between MLG and 
IGR and the existence of performance indicators. The methodology (mainly grounded in the 
positivist stream of thought) relies on PRISMA, Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic 
Reviews and Meta-Analyses (www.prisma-statement.org). This uses systematic methods to 
identify relevant researches throughout 27-item checklist and a four-phase flow diagram. 
The second work ‘Do temporary incentives to inter-municipal cooperation work?’ analyses 
whether temporary financial incentives to municipal cooperation lead to lasting outcomes. 
The outcomes are represented by the institutionalization of this cooperation typology. In 
particular, the paper analyses some possible variables that induce the consolidation of Inter 
– Municipal Associations. The methodology (mainly grounded in the philosophical school of 
Realism) refers to Realist Evaluation. It assumes that material and social worlds are ‘real’ and 
can have ‘real effects’. 
The third work ‘Anti-corruption as a programme of government’ concerns the programmes 
of government and their translation processes through managerial instruments with 
particular attention to anti-corruption programme of government. The methodology 
combines ontological realism and epistemological subjectivism, relevant perspective in 
Critical Management Studies. 
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The main structure of the dissertation can be summarized in the following Table I showing 
the object of analysis and the methodological constructs. Author adaptations and extensions 
in adherence with the thesis object of a table in Westhorp Prins, G. et all, 2011.* 
 POSITIVISM REALISM CRITICAL REALISM 
Paper Title 
1. A managerial vision on 
multilevel governance and 
intergovernmental relations:  
a literature review 
2. Do temporary incentives 
to inter-municipal 
cooperation work? 
3. Anti-corruption as a 
programme of government 
Object of 
analysis  
Managerial dimension of MLG  
Managerial dimension of 
MLG 
Managerial dimension of MLG 
Methodology  
Literature review  
PRISMA - Preferred Reporting 
Items for Systematic Reviews 
and Meta-Analyses  
http://prisma-statement.org/ 
Quantitative Analysis  
Context-Mechanism-
Outcome Configurations 
(CMOCs) 
 
Qualitative Analysis 
Deconstruction of a given reality 
to understand 
mechanisms/sequences/processes 
that support events or structured 
realities 
Main research 
question 
Does the managerial literature 
on MLG and IGR contain 
instruments of evaluation of 
MLG? 
Do temporary incentives to 
coordination lead to lasting 
outcomes? 
How does the translation 
mechanism work within and along 
a programme of government?  
Ontology 
There is an objective reality, 
which exists independent of 
us 
Material & social reality – we 
interact with reality. 
Ontological realism 
Epistemology 
Truth and final knowledge 
exist 
No final truth or knowledge, 
but improvement in 
knowledge is possible. 
Epistemological subjectivism. 
Causation 
Constant conjunction, linear 
causation. Programs cause 
outcomes.  
Mechanisms operating 
differently in different 
contexts generate patterns of 
outcomes. 
No linear causation. 
Implications for 
evaluation 
Evaluators ‘tell facts’.  
Context factors should be 
eliminated:  Quasi-
experimental methods.  
Evaluators explain how and 
where programs generate 
outcomes.  
Mixed methods (qualitative 
and/or quantitative). 
Researchers explain ‘how and why 
things happen in the way they do 
rather than in other ways’**.  
Administrative 
Levels 
Ѵ Municipality – Region Regional - National - International  
* Westhorp, G., Prins, E., Kusters, C., Hultink, M., Guijt, I., Brouwers, J. (2011) Realist Evaluation: an overview 
Report from an Expert Seminar with Dr. Gill Westhorp, 5. 
** Alvesson, M., Bridgman, T., and Willmott, H. (2009) The Oxford Handbook of Critical Management Studies. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 56. 
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Abstract. The concept of multilevel governance (MLG) developed during the European 
Integration and today conforms a range of governance systems. Social scientists shaped 
different definitions to explain a phenomenon, which comes from different contexts. A 
broad literature tries to explain if and how this mechanism affects supranational, national, 
regional and local governance. MLG theory has become important in political science and 
a defined stream of literature in Public Administration highlights the embedded meaning 
of governance and the related concept of Europeanization of Public Administration. This 
literature review outlines if and what kind of key performance indicators has been 
theoretically proposed or used. The performance indicators suggest if the MLG process 
works properly and if the policy inputs match the results. The methodological question 
arises between the overlapping definitions of MLG from a political perspective and a 
managerial approach.  The aim of this paper is to review the literature on multilevel 
governance encapsulating managerial competences related to Public Administration in 
the European context. The paper focuses on English-language scholarly literature 
highlighting the managerial mechanisms of MLG. In particular, it explores 1. the 
overlapping definitions between MLG and intergovernmental relations (IGR), 2. the 
existence - and if possible, the validity - of performance indicators. The literature dataset 
has been structured using two research engines. The papers hold in this review has been 
published from 2000 to 2015. Inasmuch as feasible, the literature review sticks to the 
PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) 
methodology. The results present the rationale and the paradigm. The rationale is the 
abstraction of policy-making process within MLG mechanisms. The paradigm related to 
performance is the translation processes of these policies in structures, processes and 
outcomes. The main limitation of the research considers the difficulty in theorizing 
managerial instruments outside case studies. The conclusion presents a different research 
approach that consider the instruments inside the whole translation process of policies in 
structures, processes and outcomes.  
Key words: multilevel governance, intergovernmental relations, PRISMA.  
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Introduction 
The rationale of this paper is the positioning of key terms such as ‘tool’ and ‘mechanism’ within 
the policy-making process, and to discuss their relation with performance. Focusing on MLG 
system, the paper investigates the way in which these instruments are translated within the 
policy decision process and highlights some differences with intergovernmental approach. 
 An etymological approach helps to understand the shift from ‘governance’ to ‘multilevel 
governance’. This premise wants to add the shaded meaning of ‘governance’ and the related 
unsettled meaning of ‘multilevel governance’. The aim is to pull out the MLG concept from its 
application in political science and analyse the managerial component. However, it is essential 
to introduce some concepts descending from political science in order to understand what is 
already known and how social and political implications created a sophisticated mechanism 
as MLG.  
I consider the relevant literature on MLG focusing on the main managerial benchmarks instead 
of summarizing the different concepts related to the theory of multilevel governance. This 
represents one of the main points of the rationale of the present essay. The literature covers 
different fields of study (political science and international relations for instance) and levels 
(international, European, national and subnational), overlapping conceptual streams 
(federalism and supra-nationalism for example) and dissimilar perspectives arising from 
participative mechanisms (democracy representation and  participatory levels  for instance).  
a. Governance. Theorists hold that there are different definitions of governance. In his 
seminal contribution, Rhodes (1996) enumerates several concepts of governance that 
contribute to the analysis of changes in British government: Governance as the minimal State, 
Governance as a Corporate Governance, Governance as New Public Management, Governance 
as good governance, Governance as a Socio – Cybernetic System, Governance as Self – 
organizing Networks. Governance as New Public Management is based on, according with 
Rhodes, two aspects: managerialism and the new institutional economics, which open to 
incentives like in market competition. Rhodes – considering governance as good governance 
- presents ‘(…) three strands to good governance: systemic, political and administrative. The 
systemic use of governance is broader than government, covering the “distribution of both 
internal and external political and economic power”. The political use of governance refers to 
“a state enjoying both legitimacy and authority, derived from a democratic mandate.”’ 
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(Rhodes, 1996). Few years later the White Paper on European Governance explains that 
‘(G)overnance means rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are 
exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, participation, accountability, 
effectiveness and coherence.’ (European Commission, 2001). Policies of governance as a Socio 
– cybernetic system are not the product of actions by central government, but the interaction 
with and between local governments, local Authorities, voluntary sector and private sector. 
Quoting Kooiman, Rhodes (1996) highlights the distinction between the process of governing 
(the so-called goal – directed interventions) and governance as the result (or the total effect) 
of socio – political administrative interventions and inter-actions. Governance as Self – 
organizing Networks implies that networks are made up of organizations that need to 
exchange resources to ‘achieve their objectives, to maximize their influence over outcomes, 
and to avoid becoming dependent on other players in the game.’ (Rhodes, 1996). From a 
managerial perspective, as pointed out by Piattoni in The evolution of the studies of European 
Union MLG ‘(While) the reasons leading to the shift from government to governance in 
economics and public administration have largely to do with the ‘management of complexity’, 
specific reasons preside over the shift from government to governance in political science.’ 
(Piattoni, 2010: 162). 
b. Multilevel governance. Marks, Hooghe and Blank (1996) evaluate contending models 
of European Union governance stemming from the experience of the 1980s and earlier 1990s. 
European states were losing their importance on the mediation of domestic interests with the 
European Commission after Maastricht Treaty. They report some useful question posed by 
state – centrist (the theorist which analyse the sources of European integration) to understand 
the passage from governance to MLG (Marks et al., 1996: 205). They sustain that ‘(O)ne does 
not have to argue that states are on the verge of political extinction to believe that their 
control of those living in their territories has significantly weakened. It is not necessary to look 
far beyond the state itself to find reasons that might explain how such outcome is possible. 
When we disaggregate the state into the actors that shape its diverse institutions, it is clear 
that the key decision-makers, above all those directing the state executives, may have goals 
that do not coincide with that of projecting state sovereignty into the future.’ (Marks et al. 
2010: 229). 
c. Intergovernmental relations. Accordingly to Phillimore, ‘we can define IGR as the 
processes and institutions through which governments within a political system interact.’ 
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(Phillimore, 2013: 229). Agranoff describes four major epochs of IGR with core administrative 
implications, quoting his previous work (2010): legal and political, welfare state 
interdependency, government/nongovernmental organization (NGO) partnerships and 
collaborative networks (Agranoff, 2011: S70).  Wright et al. (2010), after an in-depth 
explanation of IGR concept, describe the generic features of IGR to facilitate the application 
of IGR in cross-national or global context. As Authors of The changing landscape of 
intergovernmental relations and multi-level governance in the United States, they enumerate 
these features as follows: 1. Jurisdiction Complexity; 2. Actor Multiplicity; 3. Contentious 
Contingencies; 4. Multi-Functional Fragmentation; 5. Fiscal/Financial Interdependencies and 
6. Sector Boundary Blending (Wright et al., 2010: 140). 
d. Europeanization of Administrative Space. Between political science and managerial 
implications on MLG, there is the concept of Europeanization of public management. Binding 
decisions, as the European Decisions or Regulations, involve directly Member States, Regions 
or Managing Authorities – with different degrees of strength. The sovereignty, the related 
power and the decision-making process are exchanged for a heterogeneous and complex 
system of policies in a system of ‘Europeanization’. Heidbreder (2011) illustrates the emerging 
European administrative space (EAS) in a context with a ‘persistent diversity between public 
administrations’. Using a pragmatic approach, she introduces ‘a typology of the modes in 
which the supranational domestic levels of public administration interact’. The essential 
finding of the analysis show ‘that unlike the founding principle of national administrative 
autonomy, the EU has developed and applies an elaborate set of instruments that 
interconnect actors present at different levels. The quantity and quality of the various 
instruments applied vary greatly in their effect on national public administrations. They range 
from explicit rules that are hierarchically imposed, to mere side-effects of policy 
implementation or voluntary horizontal co-ordination between member states. The findings 
suggest dynamics that incrementally reduce the role of domestic administrations as truly 
independent implementing bodies.’ (Heidbreder, 2011: 723).  
 
1. Objectives 
On these bases, the MLG managerial component is defined by measurable elements, which 
represent instruments in the policy-making area and in public management. The explicit and 
main question is: does the managerial literature on MLG and IGR contain instruments of 
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evaluation of MLG? Consequently, are these “instruments” related to “performance”?  What 
is performance? There are different definitions of performance and different indicators that 
can be distinguished in relation to governance (Forbes and Lynn, 2005: 5070; Lynn, Jr. and 
Robichau, 2013: 203). ‘We need to revisit our usage of familiar performance terms such as 
‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’. Despite (or perhaps because of) the frequency of their usage, 
one should not assume that such term always have the same meaning. Terms such as the 
famous ‘three Es’ (economy, efficiency, and effectiveness) are drawn from a generic 
input/process/output/outcome framework […] and which is very widely used in both the study 
and practice of public management.’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 133).   
Theories of public policy and theories of governance may represent a starting point for the 
analysis. Robichau and Lynn (2009) argue that some of those theories do not complement 
each other very well. Working on a comparison of a (recent) theory of public sector 
performance, they suggest that ‘multilevel governance theories can supply what continues to 
be the missing link in public sector policy theories’. They examined policy theories and their 
embeddedness in governance but sustain that ‘the links between policymaking and the 
multiple levels of governance within administrative systems are not made explicit and their 
influence on outputs and outcomes are not carefully considered. By including these levels into 
policy theories, they could become more complete and insightful.’ (Robichau and Lynn JR., 
2009: 21). They outline the gap. 
To address these research questions, the study design follows this path. First, I define the 
positioning of some terms within the policy-making process (rather than presenting given 
definitions): tool, mechanism and their relation with performance.  Second, I review the 
literature on MLG with special attention to mechanisms and tools in Public Administration 
under a conceptual perspective and only in some cases using empirical or partially empirical 
studies. Third, I compare IGR approach with MLG. 
The expected outcomes reflect a logic: the evaluation instruments research in the literature. 
Indeed, future research is expected to produce theoretical models of analysis that include 
instruments (tools and mechanisms) in the space between policy design/policy making. 
The study design is composed by the following steps: identification, screening, eligibility and 
included studies. The identification presents the records through database searching ‘multi 
level governance’ OR ‘multi – level governance’ OR ‘multilevel governance’ AND ‘public 
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management’ OR PLUS ‘performance’ OR PLUS ‘mechanism’. The same protocol has been 
used with ‘intergovernmental’ OR ‘inter – governmental’ OR ‘intergovernmental’ summed 
with ‘public management’ OR PLUS ‘performance’ OR PLUS ‘mechanism’. During the screening 
the redundant records are removed. The eligibility is based on exclusion criteria as presented 
in the ‘Results’ section. 
 
2. Methods 
The literature review relies on the PRISMA methodology (Preferred Reporting Items for 
Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses, www.prisma-statement.org) to screen records, to 
assess eligibility, to exclude articles and to include the results in a qualitative synthesis. This 
methodology was originally developed for systematic reviews and evaluations of healthcare 
interventions. A systematic review, as explained by Moher et al., ‘is a review of a clearly 
formulated question that uses systematic and explicit methods to identify, select, and critically 
appraise relevant research, and to collect and analyse data from the studies that are included 
in the review’ (Moher et al., 2009:264).  PRISMA presents 27-item checklist and a four-phase 
flow diagram (Figure A with modified flow diagram). Some points within PRISMA expressly 
refer to clinical research practice. Some of the latest points are excluded, considering the 
public management field and the political science perspective presented in most of the 
assessed studies. 1 ,2  The use of PRISMA methodology and, in particular the four-phase 
diagram, represent a useful instrument to reduce the biases across the studies. ‘The general 
concepts and topics covered by PRISMA are all relevant to any systematic review, not just 
those whose objective is to summarize the benefits and harms of a healthcare intervention. 
                                                             
1 PRISMA contains different sections/topics. Some of them has been excluded because partial related to clinical 
practice or quantitative analysis. The items excluded with relative protocol number are: (5) Protocol and 
Registration, (10) Data Collection Process, (11) Data Items, (13) Summary Measures, (19) Risk of bias within the 
studies. The point (20) Results of Individual Studies requires for all outcomes considered (benefits or harms) the 
presentation of quantitative data. In addition, the points (21) Synthesis of results (which concerns the results of 
each meta-analysis done, requiring the inclusion of confidence intervals and measures of consistency) and (22) 
Risk of bias across studies have been excluded.  
2 As introduced in note (1) some PRISMA sections has been excluded in this research. PICOS point – as explained 
further – has been included partially.  PICOS guideline consists in Participants, Interventions, Comparators, 
Outcomes and Study design. The Outcomes and the Study design are presented in this literature review. 
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However, some modifications of the checklist items or flow diagram will be necessary in 
particular circumstances.’ (Moher et al., 2009: 268). 
I used inclusion criteria by key word and by research engine. The exclusion criteria could be 
repeated automatically. During the screening redundant records has been removed directly. 
The exclusion process at this stage does not concern the distinction between empirical and 
theoretical approach but the presence of MLG managerial implication in the abstract as object 
and/or as result.  
The papers included in the review come from English-language scholarly literature from 2000 
to 2015. The timespan chosen aims to highlight the relatively recent dynamics – in terms of 
policy and academic epochs in Public Administration - after the development of bourgeoning 
literature on governance. The research engines used are Scopus and Web of Science.  
I present a full electronic search strategy for at least one database. The search strategy follows 
this path and could be repeated. For instance, in Web of Science I search by topic ‘multilevel 
governance’ OR ‘multi – level governance’ OR ‘multilevel governance’ in title PLUS ‘public 
management’ in the topic. The timeframe includes papers from 2000 to 2015. The result 
presents 206 papers. I proceed by refining by research domain choosing ‘SOCIAL SCIENCE’ and 
by research area ‘PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION’. The result presents 48 papers. Another full 
electronic search strategy (with replicability character) considers Scopus research engine. In 
Scopus, I search ‘multi level governance’ OR ‘multi – level governance’ OR ‘multilevel 
governance’ PLUS ‘public management’ in the abstract. The timeframe includes papers from 
2000 to 2015 using ‘SOCIAL SCIENCE AND HUMANITIES’ as subject area. The result presents 
47 papers. Considering IGR, I propose two other examples. In Web of Science I search 
‘intergovernmental relations’ OR ‘inter-governmental relations’ OR ‘inter governmental 
relations’ in topic PLUS ‘public management’ in topic from 2000-2015. The general results are 
205 but the refined results using the filters of ‘SOCIAL SCIENCE’ as research domain and 
‘PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION’ as research area give 58 papers.  
The study selection includes all the papers passed through the previous selection process 
(abstract selection) and used a full text approach. This means that the inclusion parameters 
are based on coherent and adhesive elements of papers with the topic of present work. 
However, the main reasons of exclusion at this stage are: (1) papers entirely focus on case 
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studies about multilevel governance and/or IGR; (2) paper which are not mainly focused on 
Public Administration mechanism.  
Defining all variables for any data concerning MLG and IGR (as suggested by PRISMA 
systematic review) is not possible and goes beyond the aims of the present work - which 
mainly does not consider case studies.  
The main risk of bias resulting from the assessment of the papers – but which can not affect 
the cumulative evidence – concerns the inclusion or exclusion process. Some studies have a 
theoretical approach to MLG or IGR but use case studies that specify data. Other studies apply 
the theoretical framework on empirical examples. The biases in the interpretation of 
managerial results could arise in the overlapping area created by theoretical papers and 
papers with dominant empirical part. In empirical studies, the replicability is not guarantee 
and is not possible to exclude some paper for their relevance at theoretical level. 
 
3. Results 
The studies screened are 799: 498 from Scopus plus 301 from Web of Science. The paper 
assessed for eligibility are 32.  
3.1. Eligibility at abstract level 
The reasons of exclusion of papers not assessed for eligibility at Abstract level are the 
following: (a) case studies with minor theoretical reference or replicability as for instance 
climate change; (b) high level of specificity of main theme as for instance: forest certification, 
unemployment, rural governance, water framework directive, road maintenance, healthcare 
IT, hospital reforms, biodiversity conservation, metropolitan governance, Europeanized meat 
inspection regimes, public service performance in person-related services, minority 
government performance, waste management, coastal cultural landscape, political 
marketing, internet sale taxation, child – care policy, gender innovations, ITC sector, 
nanotechnologies; (c) analysis of private sector laterally included in MLG or IGR, as for example 
PPPs – public-private partnerships -, corporate governance analysis, private equity, nursing 
home chain (d) particular mechanisms of MLG or IGR embedded in macro-economic policies 
or macro-economic planning as for instance financial decentralization mechanisms in China, 
South Africa’s fiscal relations, Sino-American environmental relations, international regimes, 
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private diplomacy; (e) specific and prevailing theory descriptions, for example network or 
power theories. 
The papers included in the review are 23 papers. The complete study selection process is 
described in the flow diagram (Figure A, Total records identified through database searching 
and simplified PRISMA flow diagram). 
3.2. Study characteristics 
In the following section, I present the conceptual assumptions: positioning of instruments in 
policy-making process and performance; MLG and the ‘management of complexity’ and the 
managerial IGR approach. These theoretical assumptions mirror the three main relevant 
themes proposed in the prior study design and aim to reply to the main question of present 
work. 
3.2.1. Positioning of instruments in policy-making process and performance. 
The analysis of MLG and related instruments (tools and mechanisms) implies a description of 
the policy-making process. In particular, it seems useful to describe these elements and to 
present at what level of abstraction they exist. Howlett (2009), recognizing the multilevel and 
embedded nature of public policies, writes: ‘the range of choices left at the micro-level of 
concrete targeted policy tool calibrations is restricted by the kinds of meso-level decisions 
made about policy objectives and policy tools, and both of these, in turn are restricted by the 
kind of choices made at the highest ore meta-level of general policy aims and implementation 
preferences’. From the policy level, with a high level of abstraction there is a shift in a set of 
less abstract ‘objectives’. These objectives ‘must be concretized in a set of specific targets or 
measures which allow policy resources to be direct toward goal attainment (…).’ (Howlett, 
2009:74). With regard to the purposes of this paper a quite general distinction could be 
presented as follows: tools and mechanisms work at concrete and meso-level. The first point 
is to recognise the level of abstraction of these instruments, which change from one MLG 
system to another. The second point refers to the relationship between goals and means. 
Indeed, Howlett describing nested policy instruments choices explains how improved policy 
design requires the understanding of goals-means but also the nature ‘of their relationship in 
each of the different orders of policy: from governance mode to policy regime logic to 
instrument calibration’ (Howlett, 2009: 75). The problem in policy design (and more 
specifically in MLG) is not a ‘definitive definition’ of tools, mechanisms or other policy 
12 
 
instruments. The translation of these policies in practice and in instruments (called tools or 
mechanisms) represents the paradigm related to performance. This means that performance 
measurement includes the level of correct translation of policies (from the higher level of 
abstraction) in concrete tools and instruments. With these two assumptions (the level of 
abstraction of instruments within the policymaking process/design process and the 
relationship between goals and means), I can state that the rationale of present work is not 
the definition of these instruments but the translation process. Therefore, the performance 
indicators – usually mirroring and evaluating policy design – are strictly related to processes. 
Robichau and Lynn (quoting Scott) describe three categories of effectiveness indicators: 
structure, process and outcomes. ‘Structural indicators reflect the production function, that is 
the way the organization’s work is organized. Process indicators measures the quantity or 
quality of the organization’s work, that is, effort or output. Outcomes indicators purport to 
identity changes in an individual or organization that have been the object of some kind of 
intervention, service, or regulation. Thus, the effectiveness of each level of governance can be 
measured in terms of some combination of structures, processes, and outcomes.’  (Robichau 
and Lynn, 2009: 24). Are these findings applicable to MLG with particular attention to the 
policy design translation into practice? Some examples reply to the question. 
3.2.2 MLG and the ‘management of complexity’.  
Escaping from international relations premises (Knodt, 2004) and other ‘ways in which the 
MLG literature has been developed’ (Stephens, 2013), I focus on the concept outlined by 
Piattoni of ‘management of complexity’ (Piattoni, 2010: 169). EU Cohesion Policy aims to 
reduce disparities between European regions with strategies and programs. In a managerial 
perspective, strategies represent components of policy-making process with different degree 
of abstraction (declined for instance in tools and mechanisms). 
The study (and literature) of Cohesion Policy is explained by different theoretical perspectives, 
although ‘has so far been dominated by the multi-level governance model developed by 
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks and associates (…)’ (Blom-Hansen, 2005: 627). Dąbrowski, 
focusing on the Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas (JESSICA), 
investigates its effects on the operation of the MLG framework in Cohesion Policy.3 The 
exploratory research involved a comparative case study based on qualitative research 
                                                             
3 JESSICA, a financial engineering instrument (FEI) of Structural Funds. 
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methods. The study focused on the use of FEI as a part of JESSICA during the 2007 – 2013 
period and the governance mechanisms included the collaboration with financial 
intermediaries and private investors. Outside the implications of public-private involvement 
Dąbrowski confirms in conclusion ‘that reaping the potential benefits of MLG is conditional 
upon the presence of robust institutions, administrative capacity and well-established 
networks of collaborating organizations at the sub-national level.’(Dąbrowski, 2014: 11). Sub-
national levels have the chance to contribute to EU policies achievement ‘but in return for this 
autonomy, they must report regularly on their performance and participate in a peer review 
in which their results are compared with those pursuing other means to the same general 
ends.’ (Sabel and Zeithlin, 2008: 271). Peer reviews and other reports represent, for instance 
tools within the MLG policymaking process with different degree of abstraction/concreteness. 
The evaluation of complex social program includes for instance the European Social Fund 
(ESF). In 1999, The European Commission and the Italian Ministry of Welfare asked ISFOL 
(National European Social Fund Evaluation Unit) to undertake the evaluation of ESF, Objective 
3, for the period 2000-2006 as reported by the same ISFOL. This analysis highlights the 
introduction – exactly by Structural Funds – of new ways of evaluation and performance 
measurement. ‘Over the last decade, there has been a growing demand to evaluate socio-
economic programs financed by the European Union’s Structural Funds, supported by the 
MEANS (Methods for Evaluating Structural Policies) Program launched by the European 
Commission in 1995.’ (Lion and Martin, 2006: 1) 
Open Method of Coordination. From the beginning of 2000 the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) is recognised as a governance instrument. Sabel and Zeitlin (2008) enumerate specific 
elements of OMC – shaped on European Employment Strategy – from the documents of the 
Portuguese Presidency in 2000 (the Lisbon European Council Presidency Conclusions). These 
indications are: ‘Fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for 
achieving the goals which they set in the short, medium and long term; establishing, where 
appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks against the best in the 
world and tailored to the needs of different Member States and sectors as a means of 
comparing best practices; translating these European guidelines into national and regional 
policies by setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and 
regional differences; periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual 
learning processes.’ (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008: 290). The OMC has the characters of a tool but is 
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‘a powerful instrument of the soft law’. Accordingly to Baležentis et al., this instrument of soft 
law ‘embodies flexibility in seeking EU-wide goals, sovereignty losses are minimized and 
political resistance overcome’ (Baležentis et al., 2011: 11).  
These strategies include performance indicators and are present within European MLG 
context at different levels of abstraction. 
3.2.3 Managerial IGR approach. 
Toonen (2010) in his contribution - that integrates the two main theoretical perspectives of 
MLG and IGR - defines the IGR as ‘the configuration of legal, financial, political, administrative 
and organizational relationships and linkages between the different elements and units which 
are distinguished within a state – IGC [Intergovernmental Constitution] – system. IGR refers 
to the administrative or executive side of MLG, which may be more or less ‘bureaucratized’ or 
‘politicized’ in various systems of MLG.’ (Toonen, 2010: 40). This is particularly true in North – 
American systems (Kincaid and Stenberg, 2011; Kumanan et al., 2004) or for defined policies 
as for instance environment policies (Rabe, 2008; Gupta and Sanchez, 2012) In their work 
about overlapping concepts of IGR and FED (federalism) Wright, Stenberg III, and Cho explain 
how IGR differ from MLG in two respects. One is the degree to which IGR incorporates and 
emphasizes the role and interaction of elected officials and influential appointed 
administrators in governance process. The prominence of policy issues in general and of fiscal 
relationships in particular that IGR addressed are the second elements of difference (Wright 
et al., 2010: 139). 
As anticipated in the introduction of this paper, Wright et al. (2010) enumerate the features 
of IGR to facilitate its application in cross-national or global contexts as follows: (1) Jurisdiction 
Complexity; (2) Actor Multiplicity; (3) Contentious Contingencies; (4) Multi-Functional 
Fragmentation; (5) Fiscal/Financial Interdependencies and (6) Sector Boundary Blending. For 
the purposes of this essay, particular attention is given to Multi–Functional Fragmentation 
and Fiscal/Financial Interdependencies. Multi-Functional Fragmentation shows a ‘functional 
fragmentation both between/among policies/programs and across numerous jurisdictional 
entities’.  The fiscal policies ‘involving revenues, expenditures, and debt occupy a prominent 
place in inter-jurisdictional interactions; a crucial issue involves the transfer/flow of funds 
between jurisdiction and associated conditions/requirements attached to the transfers’ 
(Wright et al., 2010: 141). IGR outlines marked fiscal elements in comparison with MLG. 
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The aim of this work is to find firstly the existence of MLG performance indicators and secondly 
to highlight the differences with the managerial IGR perspective: performance achievement is 
one of the most problematic aspects of contemporary IGR. Indeed, Agranoff (2011: S74) 
explains that in the partnership and network era, one of the most vexing problems for federal 
and state managers is that while inputs can be specified, there is a lack of control over 
outcomes. The collaboration instead of performance seems to be the way that allows 
maintaining more control over the outcomes. For instance, joint cabinet meetings are 
increasingly used. A research in Canada tries to reply to some question and in particular if joint 
cabinet meetings are effective mechanisms for intergovernmental policy-making. The 
importance is given by the ‘institutional mechanism’ provided by joint cabinet meetings more 
than by cooperation itself (Berdhal, 2011: 273). This is an example of mechanisms within 
governmental levels. Agranoff (2010) describes the progressive involvement of NGOs in IGR 
and the change in managerial field articulating some principles of a theory of IGR. The last 
points enumerated by Agranoff outline that ‘(As) the non-governmental sector became 
involved, new tools of governance (for example contract management) were added to 
previous fiscal subvention, loan, regulatory, tax sharing, and executive federalism. (…) The 
new tools, plus the emergent activities in participating and managing networks, places the 
greatest IGR involvement on both the elected and appointed executives and managers who 
deal with the complexities and intricacies of policy and program’. (Agranoff, 2010: 81). As 
presented in the introduction of this paper, the managerial perspective on IGR arose during 
the last decades within Intergovernmental Management (McGuire, 2006). Intergovernmental 
Management (IGM) ‘refers to the array of problem-solving activities, procedures, techniques 
and forms of steering employed by persons who operate at the interfaces of the different 
governmental agencies.’ (Toonen, 2010: 44). It seems useful to cite some data reported by 
Wright, Stenberg III and Cho from 1940 to 2007 to understand the positioning of 
‘intergovernmental management (IGM)’. They extract data related to intergovernmental 
relations (IGR), intergovernmental management (IGM) and federalism (FED) in Public 
Administration Review. The data set extraction shows the number of articles using the concept 
of IGR, IGM and FED in Public Administration Review. Analysing historical patterns and phases 
about FED, IGR and IGM the article presents relevant data: IGM did not emerge until the 
1970s. According to the Authors ‘FED likewise achieved peak appearances in the 1970s. 
Somewhat surprisingly, however, it exceeded the usage of IGR from the 1980s onward’. The 
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concept of IGM is not recent and represents a notable ‘refinement’ over FED and IGR (Wright 
et al., 2010: 111). 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
This paper analyses the literature on MLG encapsulating managerial competences related to 
Public Administration in a European perspective. It explores the overlapping definitions 
between MLG and IGR, the existence and (if possible) the validity of performance indicators. 
The main findings related to main research points (positioning of instruments in the policy-
making process and performance, MLG and the management of complexity, Managerial IGR 
approach) produce the following considerations: 
1. European MLG context presents instruments (at different levels of abstraction) and 
performance indicators. 
2. The rationale of present work is not the definition of instruments but the translation 
process. A ‘univocal definition’ of instruments is not useful for the purposes of present work. 
The translation of public policies in practice and in instruments represents the paradigm 
related to performance (with particular attention to process indicators). 
3. Performance evaluation, starting from its wide definition, is one of the most problematic 
aspects of contemporary IGR (and MLG) systems. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to avoid 
general abstractions or an accurate case study description of performance indicators 
(explicative as the examples presented, but not in line with the general purposes of this work). 
Effectiveness indicators, according to Scott’s typology as quoted by Robichau and Lynn (2009), 
can be distinguished in three categories: structure, process and outcomes.  
The limitations of this research can be classified in endogenous and exogenous. The 
endogenous limitations consider patterns of administrative diversity within the Union (the 
French centralization for instance and the Federalism form in Germany) and historical diversity 
(for example the diarchy in EU construction between federalist perspective and supra-
nationalism models). The exogenous and main limitation consists in the difficulty in theorizing 
managerial instruments outside case studies. 
In conclusion, the present work reviewed the literature about MLG to find general (and 
eventually replicable) managerial instruments. In addition, it aimed to link these findings with 
performance indicators. MLG and IGR panorama (and literature) is enough wide to prevent a 
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classification of these instruments case by case, but theoretically structured to distinguish 
different abstraction levels of public policies (micro, meso and meta). The translation of these 
policies in practice and in instruments (tools or mechanisms for instance) represents the 
paradigm related to performance. The European context provides examples of instruments at 
different level of abstraction with related indicators, for instance in Cohesion policy or within 
the Open Method of Coordination. The link between these instruments – at different level of 
abstraction – and the performance evaluation could be classified in three categories: 
structural, process and outcome indicators.   
The MLG/IGR comparison, which considers mainly the differences in terms of macro – 
processes could be defined as the embedded policy relation in federal systems, with a 
presence of fiscal and financial interdependencies between governmental levels. 
Future literature is expected to produce models of analysis in MLG policy-making process with 
attention to policy translation.  
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FIGURE A. Total records identified through database searching and simplified PRISMA 2009 flow 
diagram (adaptation from www.prisma-statement.org) 
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Abstract. This work is grounded in the literature concerning horizontal inter-municipal 
cooperation (IMC). It analyses the consequences of financial incentives in order to 
understand whether temporary financial incentives to municipal cooperation lead to 
lasting outcomes, that is the institutionalization of IMC once incentivized arrangements 
have elapsed. 
The empirical setting is represented by the Friuli Venezia Giulia Autonomous Region in 
Italy. The program – mechanism under observation considers the incentives to municipal 
cooperation foreseen by the regional law n. 1/2006, which aimed to facilitate the 
establishment of inter-municipal associations (IMAs) for the shared delivery of functions 
and services, especially among small and disadvantaged municipalities. 
The main research question aims to understand whether temporary incentives to 
municipal coordination lead to lasting effects. With this research question, we operate 
induction at aggregate level (IMAs) and at disaggregated level (municipalities). The paper 
analyses what are possible variables that induce the consolidation of IMAs. We introduce 
three sub-research questions (RQ2, RQ3 and RQ4) about whether the attitude to remain 
in an IMA beyond the compulsory period is driven respectively by the size of a 
municipality, the number of municipalities in an IMA and the territorial features of a 
municipality.  
The conclusions of this quantitative analysis will provide some new insights about a 
possible path to the institutionalization of IMC of which IMA is an example. Indeed, it 
represents a preliminary explanation of variables related to the mechanism of incentives 
that could be extended to other similar settings.  
Key words: multilevel governance, financial incentives, inter-municipal cooperation, 
realist evaluation. 
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Introduction 
Studies about inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in Europe intensify in time of economic crisis 
(Bel and Warner, 2015: 52; Rakar et al., 2014: 732; Rakar et al., 2015: 186). Coordination 
between municipalities has been proposed and carried out in the last decades at international 
level as a way to achieve efficiency or better public service delivery. Horizontal cooperation 
between municipalities, as IMC, seems to be a solution to reduce costs (Swianiewicz, 2010: 3), 
to enhance the efficiency in service provision and delivery (Zuffada and Coperchione, 2003: 1, 
Bel and Warner, 2015: 52) and to overcome the shortages related to the fragmentation of 
local governments (Klimosvskỳ et al., 2014: 647). In the relevant literature, comparative 
overviews show that the results of IMC are different both in terms of performance and in 
terms of consolidation. A definition is necessary: the consolidation process refers mostly to 
the IMC path towards a merger among municipalities, while the institutionalization defines a 
progressive type of reinforcement, which does not explicitly result in amalgamation forms.  
Despite the increasing literature about inter-municipal cooperation, the relation between 
incentive-based policies and lasting results of collaboration is slightly investigated. The 
literature outlines the role of ‘external trigger’ or linking mechanism (Bryson et al., 2006: 46; 
Rayle and Zegras, 2013: 871). Sorrentino et al. outline – reviewing the main literature about 
incentives and public partnership – that ‘(…) most of the above-mentioned studies agree on 
the fact that the availability of funds and other incentive mechanisms is a necessary but not 
insufficient condition for public agencies to launch and develop collaborative arrangements, 
even though there are plenty of studies that claim the opposite.’ (Sorrentino et al., 2011: 23).  
This work opens with a brief overview of the literature concerning the mechanisms of 
municipal cooperation. The methodology, grounded in Realist Evaluation, uses a CMOC 
(Context-Mechanism-Outcomes Configuration) framework. The quantitative analysis, using 
aggregate and disaggregate data, aims to reply to one question related to the effectiveness of 
the mechanism and three questions related to context. The setting, Friuli Venezia Giulia 
Autonomous Region (FVG), supported Inter-Municipal Associations (IMA) that represent an 
example of IMC.4  
                                                             
4 See art. 27 of regional Law 1/2006.  
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In particular, the analysis concerns the institutionalization of IMA from 2006 (the beginning of 
the incentives for IMA from the FVG Region) to 2014 (the most recent official data collection 
point). With ‘institutionalization of IMA’ we mean the reiteration of IMA agreements. The 
analysis is based on this main question: do temporary incentives to coordination lead to lasting 
outcomes?  
 
1. Inter-municipal cooperation: an overview 
The literature shows different terminological and content distinctions about the definitions 
and mechanism of municipal cooperation (or collaboration or partnership). The mechanism 
brings back to horizontal co-ordination. In his seminal work, Peters defines co-ordination ‘as 
an end-state in which the policies and programmes of government are characterized by 
minimal redundancy, incoherence and lacunae’ adding in any case that this co-ordination is a 
continuum (Peters, 1998: 296). Horizontal co-ordination could involve – the debate is still 
open – a network definition (Pollitt and Bouchaert, 2011: 20). As Kenis and Provan outline 
‘(A)fter a period of network euphoria, during which these presence was considered as 
something positive per se, questions have arisen as to whether and under what conditions 
networks are actually performing at a level that justifies the costs of collaboration, which can 
be substantial.’ (Kenis and Provan, 2009: 440). Garlatti outlines that the network issue is 
progressively becoming relevant for the interpretation of social institutes, with particular 
attention to enterprises and, in a second phase, to public administration (Garlatti, 2013: 9). 
Network ‘is one of the terms most used to define these conglomerates of connections (other 
very common labels include: joined-up government, inter-municipal or inter-organizational 
arrangements, public partnerships, collaboration networks, inter – local agreements).’ 
(Sorrentino and Simonetta, 2012: 189). 
Despite the different wording, IMC can be used as overarching term which ‘(…) includes all 
arrangements where local governments cooperate with each other, with other public 
authorities or with private institutions.’ (Hulst et al., 2009: 265).  
The first and most consistent in terms of strength of relation is the merger of municipalities. 
Terms as ‘amalgamation’, ‘fusion’, ‘merger’ and ‘up-scaling’ are also used to describe stronger 
forms of cooperation (Rakar et al., 2014: 734; Rakar et al., 2015: 188). Hertzog, analysing in 
particular the French case, presented a useful definition of ‘amalgamation’ in these terms: ‘(…) 
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two or more existing communes merge into a single one that will have the same territory and 
population as the former ones, but with only one legal personality, one budget, one assembly, 
and one executive staff. (…)’ clearly stating at the end that ‘X communes have changed into a 
single one’ (Hertzog, 2010: 296). 
The literature distinguishes between different degrees of cooperation: from lighter forms until 
strongest forms. This is a matter of organizational integration, as pointed out by Hulst et al., 
which distinguish between standing organizations and agreements. ‘A standing organization 
represents the most organizationally integrated form of cooperation. It implies the integration 
of activities formerly carried out individually by municipalities into a new organizational jointly 
run by the municipalities and any admissible participants.’ (Hulst et al., 2009: 276).  
With attention to IMAs another aspect is represented by cooperation forms which represent 
a stepping stone to stronger forms, as for instance amalgamations. Are these preparatory 
phases towards a merger across municipalities? Under certain conditions, ‘a transition from 
simpler forms of cooperation to more complex forms in the development of the involved 
territories’ (Labianca, 2014: 185) seems possible. Also Franzke et al., discussing if this kind of 
cooperation could represent a potential preparation to further and stronger forms, pointed 
out that: ‘(…) IMC might be potentially the first institutional step towards amalgamation. 
However, there is no automatism. In addition, it remains theoretically controversial whether 
a fragmented or consolidated structure should be preferred’ (Franzke et al, 2016: 84). ‘Thus, 
the question about the choice between amalgamation and IMC makes sense – because they 
are possible solutions to the same problem and, therefore, have to face the same difficulties. 
However, they are not just alternate choices; they may even be complementary.’ as explained 
by Hertzog (Hertzog, 2010: 298). IMC, quoting a useful (or operational) definition by Hertzog 
(2010: 297) is constituted by the following elements: working together; a formal agreement 
to do so; a cost (less freedom to act, financial and human commitment); a common objective 
(create new gains for all parties). Therefore, the IMAs foreseen by the FVG Region, which 
aimed at the shared management and delivery of public functions and services, represent a 
form of IMC. 
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2. Realist Evaluation Approach 
The theoretical approach used for this research is realist evaluation (RE), grounded in the 
philosophical school of realism. It assumes that material and social worlds are ‘real’ and can 
have ‘real effects’. In particular, in RE, the main question (‘the basic evaluation question) asks 
‘what works for whom, in what contexts, in what respects and how’ (Westhorp et al., 2011: 
1). As explained by Westhorp et al., RE uses Context-Mechanism-Outcome Configuration 
(CMOCs). Context refers to features of participants, organizations, staffing, history, culture, 
beliefs, etc.. As outlined by Pawson and Tilley ‘(C)ontext describes those features of the 
conditions in which programmes are introduced that are relevant to the operation of the 
programme mechanisms. Realism utilises contextual thinking to address the issues of ‘for 
whom’ and ‘in what circumstances’ a programme will work.’ (Pawson and Tilley, 2004: 7) 
Programmes, as defined by Pawson and Tilley according to realist evaluation programmes, are 
theories embedded in a social reality, represent open – systems and are active (2004: 3).  
Mechanisms do not explain, in realist evaluation terms ‘how the programme works’. ‘In fact, 
it is not programmes that work but the resources they offer to enable their subjects to make 
them work. This process of how subjects interpret and act upon the intervention stratagem is 
known as the programme ‘mechanism’ and it is the pivot around which realist research 
revolves.’ (Pawson and Tilley, 2004: 6). 
RE overturn the perspective ‘(I)t says that programs offer resources or opportunities, but is 
the decision making of participants that causes the outcomes.’ (Westhorp et al., 2011: 5) 
Considering the context and the mechanism, we analyse whether a temporary financial 
incentive favours the institutionalizations of IMAs (RQ1) and what are the possible context 
factors that affect the institutionalization of IMAs induced by certain incentivising mechanisms 
(RQ2, RQ3 and RQ4).  
RQ1. Do temporary incentives lead to lasting cooperation?  
This is the main research question, which aims to establish whether a mechanism such as 
temporary incentives leads to the desired outcome of IMA institutionalization. 
RQ2: Does the population of a municipality influence its attitude to remain in an IMA? 
The FVG Region supported shared management among neighbouring small municipalities in 
order to deliver services more efficiently. Furthermore, the population size of municipalities 
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represents one of the main criteria that increases, in percentage, the basic incentives to 
associated forms (§3). 
RQ3: Does the number of municipalities in an IMA influence the likelihood to reiterate an IMA? 
The number of municipalities composing an IMA was another of the criteria which determined 
the basic incentives to associated forms (§3). In particular, the FVG Region wished to favour 
the association of as many municipalities as possible in the same IMA. 
RQ4: Does the territorial configuration of a municipality influence its attitude to remain in an 
IMA?  
In the FVG Region population density in mountain areas is extremely low, for this reason 
municipalities have been classified as mountain and non-mountain.5  
 
3. The program: financial incentives to inter-municipal cooperation in Friuli Venezia Giulia 
Before the economic crisis of 2008 that involved most Western countries, the FVG Region 
promoted IMC between municipalities with financial incentives released in a modular way. 6  
The regional law n.1 enacted on 9 January 2006, ‘Principles and fundamental norms of Region 
– Local Autonomies in Friuli Venezia Giulia’ (hereafter Law n.1/2006) represented the new 
normative architecture concerning these different forms of cooperation. Mergers among 
municipalities have always been promoted as the main and strongest form of cooperation.  
The ‘programme’ introduced by the regional Law 1/2006, and in particular by chapter V, 
concerned the coordination of functions and the associated administration of services 
between local entities. The regional law established three main forms of inter-municipal 
coordination supported by incentives:  
- Inter - municipal Associations (IMAs); 
- Unions of Municipalities (UMs); 
                                                             
5 Concerning the population density see p. 6 (Friuli Venezia Giulia Autonomous Region, 2014b); with reference 
to mountain and non-mountain classification see Annex A of regional law n. 33/2002 (Friuli Venezia Giulia 
Autonomous Region, 2002). 
6 About the general coordination mechanism and in particular about the different policy tools see Garlatti et al. 
(2015: A4).    
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- Merger of Municipalities (MMs). 
IMAs represent groups of neighboured municipalities with homogeneous features at 
territorial and socio-economic level. The recipients of incentives for associated forms of 
cooperation were: IMAs, UMs and MMs. The incentive mechanism was structured in: an 
extraordinary initial incentive (an inception incentive) to cover the initial expenses and 
ordinary annual incentives for every function or service which would be shared at any point 
during the life of an IMA for a maximum incentive duration of six years.  
The extraordinary initial incentive (for IMAs and UMs) is evaluated on the bases of the legal 
nature of the associated forms and of the number of municipalities involved in the 
cooperation. It is augmented in respect of density parameters and eventual feasibility study 
(Friuli Venezia Giulia Autonomous Region, 2014b: 31). Provisions on overlapping financial 
incentives and changes in cooperation asset are defined and sanctioned by the partial 
rendering of the extraordinary initial incentive.  
The population size of municipalities represents one of the main criteria that increases, in 
percentage, the basic incentives to associated forms. The others two criteria are represented 
by the number of municipalities composing an IMA and the total area (in square kilometres) 
composing the Association. 
In the intentions of the legislator, the ordinary incentives, released for six years for every 
shared function or service, represented a way to support the ordinary administration of 
municipal cooperation. In other words, incentives were delivered to support the transition 
from municipal cooperation settlement to municipal cooperation institutionalization.  
The ordinary incentives, which support functions or services, decrease in a modular way: in 
the third year of 5%, in the fourth year of 15%, in the fifth year of 30%, in the sixth year of 
50%. The decreasing rate is calculated on singular function/service value or macro - function.  
As for extraordinary incentives, ordinary incentives forecast sanctionary provisions that 
consist in the partial rendering of the funds: the curtailment is related to the lack of effective 
shared services. 
Aside from this programme, the setting of this research has been choose for three main 
reasons.  
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a) The FVG Autonomous Region has optimal parameters to analyse context factors. With 
respect to size, the region has an average municipality population of 5.681 inhabitants, even 
lower than the Italian average municipality population of 7.554 inhabitants.7 Furthermore, the 
demo-spatial character of the region outlines an emphasized low population density, in 
particular in mountain areas.8  
 b) In Italy, recent developments of the IMA phenomenon are mostly analysed through 
regional case studies (Zuffada and Coperchione, 2003; Sorrentino et al., 2011; Labianca, 2014). 
c) The FVG Autonomous Region has a special statute with enhanced regional legislative 
powers that include normative autonomy in accordance with national law about defined 
issues – as for instance local government. 
 
4. Context, mechanism, outcome configuration of IMAs in Friuli Venezia Giulia 
This paper applies the CMOC to the analysis of IMAs in the FVG Region as follows: 
 Context: municipality population and municipality territorial features. 
 Mechanism: regional Law n.1/2006.  
 Outcome: consolidation of IMA that is reiteration of IMA agreements after the end of 
the compulsory period. 
Research questions. The main research question concerns the lasting results of temporary 
incentives for IMC.  
RQ1. Do temporary incentives lead to lasting cooperation? That is: have the agreements 
(“convenzioni”) been reiterated after six years (compulsory period) from been signed? 
With this research question, we operate both at aggregate level, that is at IMA level, and at 
disaggregate level, that is at municipality level. The analysis uses frequency analysis 
considering as the cut-off date for the end of the compulsory period 15.02.2014, which is the 
                                                             
7 The Friuli Venezia Giulia data are: 1.227.122 inhabitants, 216 municipalities, at 31.12.2014 (Friuli Venezia Giulia 
Autonomous Region, 2015: 24). The national data are: 60.795.612 inhabitants, 8.048 municipalities at 01.01.2015 
(Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, 2015).  
8 See note 3 about density.  
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date of the last survey of IMAs by the Friuli Venezia Giulia Autonomous Region. The analysis 
will consider as ‘reiterated’: 
 the agreements which were reiterated by the same municipalities as for the initial 
agreements;  
 the agreements which were reiterated by a modified group of municipalities than 
those who had signed the initial agreement; 
 the agreements which were signed from the start for a period longer than six years 
(the compulsory period) and were still active as of 15.02.2014 .  
Indicator: status of IMAs in 2014 – active/non active. 
Source: Table of Municipality Unions, Inter-municipal Associations and Amalgamations of 
Municipalities – Year 2014 (Friuli Venezia Giulia Autonomous Region, 2014b: 18). 
As mentioned in the theoretical approach (§2), three sub-questions were included: 
RQ2: Does the population of a municipality influence its attitude to remain in an IMA? 
This research question looks at the disaggregate level, that is municipality level: the evaluation 
uses bivariate analysis comparing the population of municipalities which are still members of 
an IMA after the compulsory period to the population of those which are not anymore in an 
IMA after the compulsory period. 
Indicator: municipality population (2012).  
Source:  
 Table of Municipality Unions, Inter-municipal Associations and Amalgamations of 
Municipalities – Year 2014 (Friuli Venezia Giulia Autonomous Region, 2014b: 18).  
 Regional Annual Statistical Report, 2013, municipality population at 31.12.2012 (Friuli 
Venezia Giulia Autonomous Region, 2013: 281).  
RQ3: Does the number of municipalities in an IMA influence the likelihood to reiterate an IMA? 
This research question works at aggregate level, that is IMA level: the evaluation uses bivariate 
analysis comparing the average number of municipalities which were present in IMAs which 
were reiterated to the average number of municipalities in IMAs which were not reiterated. 
Indicator: number of municipalities in an IMA (2014).  
Source:  
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 Table of Municipality Unions, Inter-municipal Associations and Amalgamations of 
Municipalities – Year 2014 (Friuli Venezia Giulia Autonomous Region, 2014b: 18).  
RQ4: Does the territorial configuration of a municipality influence its attitude to remain in an 
IMA?  
With this research question, we operate at municipality level: we use bivariate analysis 
comparing the territorial features of municipalities (mountain/non mountain) which are still 
members of an IMA after the compulsory period to the territorial features of those which are 
not anymore in an IMA after the compulsory period.  
Indicator: mountain municipalities: yes/ no.  
Source:  
 Table of Municipality Unions, Inter-municipal Associations and Amalgamations of 
Municipalities – Year 2014 (Friuli Venezia Giulia Autonomous Region, 2014b: 18)..  
 Annex A, Regional Law n. 33/2002 (Friuli Venezia Giulia Autonomous Region, 2002).  
 
5. Empirical results 
The main research question concerns the lasting results of temporary incentives for inter-
municipal coordination. The empirical results will be explained below.  
 
RQ1. Do temporary incentives lead to lasting cooperation? That is: have the agreements been 
extended once financial incentives expired? 
Result: Yes, at inter-municipal level more than 70% of IMA reiterated their agreement during the period 
2006-2014 and at municipal level more than 80% of municipalities reiterated the IMA agreement. 
 
According to the Regional survey, 40 IMAs were enacted between 2006 and 2013 but as of 
15.2.2014 only 25 IMAs still existed. Another three, de facto reiterated their agreement, but 
after the deadline used for the publication of the survey.9  
                                                             
9 In particular: 1. ‘Alta Val Degano – Val Pesarina’, 2. ‘Collio – Isonzo’, 3. ‘Pedemontana Occidentale’. 
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Veritably, the analysis will consider 28 IMAs as reiterated. Moreover, all members from the 
IMA ‘Alta Valcellina’ and IMA ‘Maniaghese’ joined the IMA ‘Valli e Dolomiti Friulane’, 
therefore in reality: 
 
 Count % 
IMA reiterated 28 70% 
Joined another IMA 2 5% 
IMA not reiterated 10 25% 
Total 40 100% 
Table 1. IMA reiterated 
 
Therefore, the frequency analysis shows that most IMAs (75%) were reiterated. 
However, five out of 28 IMAs reiterated changed their composition with municipalities leaving 
or joining. 10 Hence, we observe too much variation at IMA level to do a deeper analysis, better 
to focus directly on municipalities. The municipalities that decided to join at least one IMA 
during the period considered (2006 – 2014) were 209 out of 217, the total FVG 
municipalities.11  
Frequency analysis at municipality level reveals that the great majority (86%) reiterated their 
IMA agreements beyond the compulsory period: 
                                                             
10 Namely, the five IMA that change composition are: a. ‘Associazione Inter-Comunale tra i comuni di Buttrio, 
Cividale del Friuli, Corno di Rosazzo, Manzano, Moimacco, Pavia di Udine, Pradamano, Premariacco, Prepotto, 
Remanzacco, San Giovanni al Natisone, Santa Maria La Longa, Torreano, Trivignano Udinese’, b. Consorzio 
‘Comunità Collinare del Friuli’, c. ‘Associazione Intercomunale Palmarino’, d. ‘Associazione intercomunale tra i 
Comuni di Brugnera, Caneva, Porcia, Sacile’, e.  ‘Associazione Intercomunale Mare-Carso’. 
11 217 municipalities at the beginning of 2014.   
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 Count % 
Municipalities which reiterated IMA (RQ1 = 1) 179 86% 
Municipalities which did not reiterate IMA (RQ1 = 0) 30 14% 
Total municipalities 209 100% 
Table 2. Municipalities reiterating IMA 
 
RQ2: Does the population of a municipality influence its attitude to remain in an IMA? 
Result: Yes, bivariate analysis shows that there is a negative and significant relationship between 
municipality size and IMA reiteration; this means that the larger the population, the less likely that the 
municipality reiterated an IMA agreement. 
 
We consider population size as the independent variable. IMAs were instituted in particular 
to help small municipalities to share functions and deliver together, hence more efficiently, 
public services (Zanin, 2013: 68).  
Over 60% of the municipalities in the FVG Region are small, that is, they have up to 3000 
inhabitants.12  
 
  Count % 
Small municipalities (below or equal than 
3000 inhabitants) 128 61% 
Other municipalities 81 39% 
Total municipalities 209 100% 
Table 3. Municipality size and IMA reiteration 
                                                             
12 As defined by article 7 of the regional Law 1/2006. 
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Comparing the mean population of municipalities which reiterated their IMA agreements with 
that of municipalities which did not, reveals that municipalities which did not reiterate their 
IMA agreements are much larger, indeed their population is three times as much on average 
(Table 4) with respect to municipalities which reiterated their IMA agreements. 
 
Means test analysis 
Average pop. for municipalities which reiterated IMA (RQ1 = 1):  3696 inhabitants 
Average pop. for municipalities which did not reiterate IMA (RQ1 = 0): 11202 inhabitants 
Pearson’s R correlation coefficient: -0.30 (significant at 95% CI) 
Independent samples T-test:   significant at 95% CI  
Table 4. Means test analysis for population size and IMA reiteration 
 
A cross-tabulation between reiteration and municipalities categorized by size (small, medium 
and large) confirms that larger municipalities had a lower degree of reiteration (Table 5). 13  
  Small Medium Large Total 
Municipalities which reiterated IMA (RQ1 = 1) Count 115 50 14 179 
 % 90% 85% 64% 86% 
Municipalities which did not reiterate IMA (RQ1 = 0) Count 13 9 8 30 
 % 10% 15% 36% 14% 
Total municipalities Count 128 59 22 209 
 % 61% 28% 11% 100% 
Pearson’s R correlation coefficient:  
-0.21 (significant at 95% CI) 
    
 
Table 5. Relation between municipality size and IMA reiteration 
                                                             
13 Municipality size was recorded in three categories as follows: small if ≤3000 inhabitants, medium if 3001-9999 
inhabitants, large if 10000 or more inhabitants. 
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As seen before, more than half of the municipalities of the FVG Region are small (61%) and 
only a tenth of them (10%) did not reiterate the agreement. The medium and large 
municipalities (respectively 28% and 11% of the total municipalities of the region) show a 
lower inclination for the reiteration of their IMA agreements and noticeably a third (36%) of 
large municipalities did not reiterate their IMA agreements.  
In this respect, it is interesting to observe that none of the provincial capitals (Gorizia, 
Pordenone, Udine) reiterated their IMA agreements, while the regional capital, Trieste, never 
joined an IMA. 
 
RQ3: Does the number of municipalities in an IMA influence the likelihood to reiterate an IMA? 
Result: Bivariate analysis shows that there is a positive relationship between number of municipalities 
in an IMA and IMA reiteration; this means that the more municipalities there are in an IMA, the more 
likely that they reiterate their cooperation agreement. 
 
‘Number of municipalities’ was chosen as the independent variable. Comparing the mean 
number of municipalities in an IMA which was reiterated with that of IMAs which were not, 
reveals that IMAs which were reiterated are composed by a greater number of municipalities, 
indeed they have twice as many municipalities (Table 6). 
 
Means test analysis 
Average number of municipalities in reiterated IMA (RQ1 = 1):  6 municipalities 
Average number of municipalities in not reiterated IMA (RQ1 = 0): 3 municipalities 
Pearson’s R correlation coefficient: 0.42 (significant at 95% CI) 
Independent samples T-test:   significant at 95% CI  
Table 6. Means test analysis for number of municipality and IMA reiteration 
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RQ4: Does the territorial configuration of a municipality influence its attitude to remain in an IMA? 
Result: Bivariate analysis shows that there is no significant relationship between mountain 
municipalities and IMA reiteration; this means that mountain municipalities are no more likely than 
others to reiterate an IMA agreement. 
 
‘Mountain municipality’ was chosen as the independent variable. The location of these 
municipalities has peculiar socio-economic features in comparison to the rest of the FVG 
Region as foreseen by the regional Law n.33/2002.14 Half of the municipalities in the FVG 
Region are labelled ‘mountain municipalities’ and are classified as ‘homogeneous mountain 
zones’ (Table 7).  
 
 Count % 
Mountain municipalities 102 49% 
Non-mountain municipalities 107 51% 
Total municipalities 209 100% 
Table 7. Classification of municipalities 
 
The cross-tabulation between reiteration and mountain municipality (Table 8) shows no 
significant result, indicating that, contrary to what was expected, there is no direct 
relationship between reiteration of an IMA agreement and mountain status. 
                                                             
14 The Law n.33/2002 promotes the homogeneous development of the regional community. This goal passes 
through the safeguard and promotion of mountain areas and through the socio-economic development of 
mountain inhabitants. In Annex A, it classifies the ‘mountain homogeneous zones’ which include mountain and 
partially mountain areas.  
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 Mountain Non-
mountain Total 
Municipalities which reiterated IMA (RQ1 = 1) Count 90 89 179 
 % 88.2% 83.2% 85.6% 
Municipalities which did not reiterate IMA (RQ1 
= 0) 
Count 12 18 
30 
 % 11.8% 16.8% 14.4% 
Total municipalities Count 102 107 209 
 % 49% 51% 100% 
Pearson’s R correlation coefficient:  
0.07 (not significant at 95% CI) 
   
 
Table 8. IMA reiteration and mountain status relation 
 
6. Implications and discussion 
The main question aimed at understanding whether temporary incentives to municipal 
coordination - and in particular IMAs – lead to lasting effects. The answer is positive: the 
incentives produced lasting effects in terms of agreements duration and agreements 
reiteration for most municipalities in the FVG Region. Population size and the number of 
municipalities present in an IMA represent the independent variable that influence the 
attitude to maintain the (or to remain in a form of) municipal coordination. Instead, features 
concerning the location of municipalities seem not to be relevant, specifically for the 
municipalities located in mountain areas. 
 
The first result for RQ1 (namely the relation between temporary incentives and the 
consolidation of IMAs) is positive. As foreseen by the law, the compulsory duration of these 
agreements was six years. However, the analysis at disaggregate level – municipalities – shows 
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(1) a lasting effect over the six years from the first agreement with (2) a few changes in the 
composition of IMAs with only some municipalities which dropped out or changed IMA.  
These results can be further explained in different ways.  
a. In 2014, the cooperation between municipalities reached a level of consolidation (in 
terms of shared services and jointed functions) which made disaggregation counter-
productive in economic terms (Zanin, 2013: 77). We could then conclude that inter-
municipal cooperation represents a better instrument for the management of 
functions and services than individual municipality management. 
b. In 2014 there were still services or functions, which had not yet been activated and 
that represented potential further financial resources in terms of ordinary incentives.  
If the latter was the case, then IMAs could be at some point disbanded and therefore 
reiteration would not have implied institutionalization. If instead the former was true, then 
inter-municipal cooperation could represent or could become a stepping stone to stronger 
forms of cooperation.  
 
As far as contextual factors are concerned, the analysis revealed some interesting findings. 
The relation explored by RQ2 (namely the influence of municipality population in relation to 
the attitude to remain in IMA) is negative. Not only on average the smaller municipalities are 
more likely to reiterate their IMA agreements, but also the presence of large municipalities 
seems fatal to IMAs: although larger municipalities receive higher incentives for IMA, they 
were less likely to reiterate their agreements. 
Moreover, the analysis for RQ3 revealed that the number of municipalities involved is 
important: the more municipalities composed an IMA, the more likely that IMA was 
reiterated. This seems to suggest that an association of many small municipalities is more 
robust as they recognise the advantages offered by working together beyond the initial 
incentive. On the other hand, in a small network, especially if there is a large municipality, 
reiteration was less likely. These results seem to contradict some of the findings of other 
management studies on network efficiency and efficacy. For example, Hasnain-Wynia et al. 
(2003) find that the larger the network, the lower the degree of its perceived effectiveness, 
while Weiner et al. (1998) and Brown et al. (1998) determine that to achieve higher levels of 
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network performance it is necessary to cap the number of network members. Moreover, 
according to Provan and Milward (1995) the presence of a central core agency in a network 
should ensure better performance. Nevertheless, the IMA with a large municipality were less 
likely to be reiterated.  
However, there are various arguments which could help explain our findings, including that 
few smaller municipalities feel overpowered in their IMA by a larger one or that the larger 
municipality does not to appreciate why to reiterate an IMA agreement beyond the 
compulsory period necessary to get the regional incentives. Furthermore, the function of 
“network manager” implicitly assumed by large municipalities could imply a role of facilitator 
or mediator (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001: 318). This last point could help explain why large 
municipalities, such as Udine, prefer not reiterating IMAs composed by other small and 
medium municipalities or why large municipalities such as Trieste did not join the cooperation 
programme at all. 
The analysis for RQ4 (namely the influence of territorial configuration of municipalities on the 
attitude to remain in IMA) reached no significant result. This means that disadvantaged 
mountain areas were no more likely than non-mountain municipalities to institutionalize IMC. 
Considering the aims for which IMA incentives were designed, it is important to notice that 
small municipalities were more sensitive to those arguments, while mountain areas did not 
necessarily buy into the FVG Region’s strategy. Hence, for a CMO’s perspective the incentive 
mechanism worked better at reaching the hoped-for output, that is IMA reiteration and thus 
institutionalization, in certain context, i.e. small municipalities, than others, i.e. mountain 
areas. It needs to be remembered, though that small municipalities and mountain 
municipalities are often the same and there may be a correlation between these independent 
variables, which is difficult to establish with such small samples.  
 
7. Limitations and further research  
This work focused on the institutionalization, meant as reiteration, of IMA. It did not look at 
more specific management issues such as the control of costs or the number of functions and 
services activated by each IMA: the results do not show how many activities have been 
financed by ordinary incentives. This consideration lies outside the purpose of this research, 
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whose main objective was to understand the ‘lasting effect’ of inception incentives. However, 
considering the consolidation mechanism towards stronger forms of cooperation, further 
explanations could be drawn by analysing the effects of financial incentives obtained for 
specific functions and services.  
The entire regional area has been covered by the financial mechanism (considering also the 
Unions) activated by the regional law 1/2006 with few exceptions.15 This implies two 
restrictions: geographical, since the results should be validated by the analysis of other 
locations, and temporal, since the mechanism refers specifically to law 1/2006 while other 
incentive regulations could have been more or less effective. 
Lastly, RQ4 focused on a single territorial feature (mountain/non-mountain) to look at 
disadvantaged municipalities. The fact that the relationship between this variable and the 
attitude to remain in an IMA was not significant seems paradoxical, because IMC design and 
the related incentives could also favour socio-economically disadvantaged municipalities, 
which in its categorization corresponded to mountain areas. It had hoped to encourage 
through incentives mountain municipalities to reduce costs through the shared delivery of 
services. Yet, mountain/non-mountain might have been the wrong indicator to measure and 
distinguish between socio-economically disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged areas. Hence, 
it is not a foregone conclusion that socio-economically disadvantaged municipalities are less 
likely to institutionalize cooperation. 
 
8. Conclusions 
The results of this research about the relation between incentives and inter-municipal 
cooperation in terms of agreement duration confirm that temporary incentives can be a valid 
mechanism towards the institutionalization of such practices. The lasting effect in terms of 
IMA duration produced by incentives can be explained at least in two ways: it represents a 
path to stronger forms of consolidation and/or that joint-service management and delivery is 
better than individual service management and delivery. Furthermore, disaggregation could 
be counter-productive in economic terms.  
                                                             
15 Dolegna del Collio, Grado, San Floriano del Collio, Tarcento, Trieste and Vito d’Asio.  
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When designing incentive schemes, the relative importance of specific context variables 
should be taken into consideration. This paper found that the size and number of 
municipalities influence the attitude to institutionalize municipal coordination over time. On 
the contrary, territorial configuration, another context variable on the basis of which 
incentives in the FVG Region were granted, does not have significant influence. Moreover, 
special attention should be placed on large municipalities. In the FVG Region they either did 
not join municipal coordination from the very beginning or, if they did, they did not 
institutionalise it after receiving the initial incentives. This phenomenon can be explained by 
the weight to become ‘network managers’. Ways to counteract it need to be thought of, if 
IMC needs to appeal also to larger municipalities beyond initial incentives. 
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Abstract. This work looks at programmes of government and their implementation 
through managerial translations. It expressly connects to a stream of literature that has 
been developed mostly in the public sector accounting field and published in top 
accounting journals in the last couple of the decades. This literature offers a particular 
interpretation of public management transformation by looking at the role of specific 
‘technologies’ of governance, control and verification in translating abstract ideas of 
improvement into actual processes (Foucault, 1976, 1977; Rose and Miller, 1992; Rose, 
1996; Panozzo, 2000; Newman, 2001; Czarniawska, 2004; Latour, 2005; Lascoumes and 
Le Gales, 2007; Sørensen and Torfing, 2007; Miller and Rose, 2008).  
The first part of this work ‘Anti-corruption as a government programme’ assumes that 
programmes of government are not only sustained by political rationalities but also made 
visible and concrete by practices of calculation and measurement. We focus on one of 
these programmes - anti-corruption - in order to describe how this mechanism works at 
different levels. In particular, the question is the following: how does the translation 
mechanism of a programme of government work? In addition, what are the managerial 
tools that sustain its enactment? The first section outlines the contribution of an 
interdisciplinary approach to managerial literature. It deals with the moral matter (as part 
of moral form that sustains the political rationalities) and outlines its relation with anti-
corruption development and “industrialization”. The documental research concentrates 
on anti-corruption programme in Italy considering some meaningful documents produced 
before the enactment of the Italian Law No.190/2012 and describing the perceived level 
of corruption. 
The empirical part ‘Anti-corruption as a programme of government: local practices’ 
analyses the impact produced by this translation process at organizational level, in 
particular for the regional Administration of Friuli Venezia Giulia, an Italian autonomous 
region. During a period of economic crisis and (national) political de-legitimation, the main 
results show an improvement of bureaucratization and a progressive introduction of 
‘integrity’ measures translated from international governance standards.  
 
Key words: anti-corruption, international organizations, Italy, morality, translation. 
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Introduction and conceptual framework 
This paper analyses the translation of programmes of government with particular attention to 
anti-corruption issue. It expressly connects to a stream of literature that has mostly been 
developed by public accounting scholars and published in top accounting journals in the last 
couple of the decades. This literature offers a peculiar interpretation of public management 
transformations by looking at the role of specific “technologies” of governance, control and 
verification in translating abstract ideas of improvement into actual processes (Foucault, 1976, 
1977; Rose and Miller, 1992; Rose, 1996; Panozzo, 2000; Newman, 2001; Czarniawska, 2004; 
Latour, 2005; Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007; Sørensen and Torfing, 2007; Miller and Rose, 
2008). Following this research theme, we assume that government programmes are made 
visible and concrete by practices of calculation and measurement.  
Government programmes arise from the failures of government and aim to fix problems. They 
are sustained by political rationalities: the consistencies of a political discourse that support 
the representation of reality. Political rationalities - which have a moral form, an 
epistemological character and a language – constitute the architecture that sustains the 
enactment of government programmes (Rose and Miller, 1992). Is there a relation between 
the translation mechanism and power? We assume that power is a widespread phenomenon: 
there are multiple centres of power (Miller and Rose, 2008). 
The centres of calculation represent the centres of power through the inscription of reality 
(Rose and Miller, 1992). This is a form of transposition of the knowledge of the world through 
data. Specifically, the actors involved are the collectors, editors and mediators of specific 
information, knowledge and tools.  
The main question is the following: how does the translation mechanism of a programme of 
government work and, what are the managerial instruments that sustain its enactment? 
The first part of this paper outlines the moral form upon which an anti-corruption programme 
was conceptualized and describes what solutions have been preferred. It concentrates on how 
(and not specifically on “why”) this mechanism works through multiple centres of calculation 
and power (Miller and Rose, 2008). The “why” question and its reply could be derived by the 
“how” question: we do not search a causal explanation to this translations, but we rather 
describe a sequence of significant events, facts, documents, reports, behaviours (Foucault,  
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1976, 1977) which are connected to the translation mechanism. This significant ensemble 
represents another reading of reality through a managerial perspective.  
Supported by the documental research, the first part unravels the translation of government 
programmes along international and national levels and through different centres of 
calculation.16 
The empirical part, sustained by the documental research, the participant observation and the 
interviews, outlines the managerial and moral implications of this translation at local level.   
 
1. Anti-corruption as a government programme 
Occurrences of sleaze and bribery among public officers and officials are investigated and 
treated as corruption within the Public Administration. Corruption, according to the definition 
given by the Civil Law Convention on Corruption means ‘requesting, offering, giving or 
accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe or any other undue advantage or prospect thereof, 
which distorts the proper performance of any duty or behavior required of the recipient of 
the bribe, the undue advantage or the prospect thereof’ (Council of Europe, 1999: 2). 
A brief description of the evolution of anti-corruption discourse and practices is necessary to 
understand the dynamics that have influenced the creation of the government programmes 
in international settings as well as national realities. In particular, it is important to appreciate 
how an anti-corruption programme has changed the principles it rests upon over time, 
according to the different weight given to moral issues or to the technical nature of anti-
corruption programmes themselves.17  
                                                             
16 A framework with different levels is useful in order to distinguish between the strategies of international and 
regional organizations. According to Alvesson, Bridgman and Willmott management and organization 
researchers ‘who draw extensively on critical realist thinking may need to guard against an overemphasis on 
structurally-based forms of explanation. But they remain convinced that the considerably enhanced explanatory 
power that critical realist principles and modes of analysis makes available to them in their efforts to construct 
and test “analytical narratives of emergence” are vitally necessary to our understanding of the dynamics (...).’ 
(Alvesson, Bridgman, Willmott, 2009: 69). 
17 It is possible to observe this difference with reference to the main political discourse used in North America, 
for instance, the difference in the conception of anti-corruption practices is outlined between the liberal (or neo-
liberal) and the republican discourse. 
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The description of this dynamics leads to a concrete case: the introduction of new anti-
corruption measures in Italy in 2012. Countering corruption is an old battle in Italy. At the 
beginning of the ‘80s corruption problems became, for a while, a political – institutional moral 
problem (Scalfari, 2011). Ten years later Mani pulite (‘Clean hands’) era involved in judicial 
investigations public officers, politicians and entrepreneurs (Panozzo, 2000). After the great 
attention given to these judicial inquires, media reports produced a sort of ‘saturation effect’ 
(Vannucci, 2009). Few years later from the beginning of the economic crisis (2008), trust in 
politicians and political institutions progressively decreased (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2013). The failure 
not only of the government of the day but of much of the political system (as mentioned in 
the introduction) needed restructuring measures.  
According to international outfits - in particular the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and the Council of Europe - and non-governmental organizations 
such as Transparency International, the level of corruption - and perceived corruption - 
augmented in 2010 – 11 in Italy. A special Commission, appointed by the new technical 
government in 2012, was entrusted with the development of a report about corruption. In 
November 2012, Italian Law No.190 was enacted to strengthen the anti-corruption measures 
for Public Administration.  
1.1 The anti-corruption (liberal) discourse  
The discourse about anti-corruption has changed over the years (Polzer, 2001). After the Cold 
War, the transition to a neo-liberal economy was promoted and it included anti-corruption 
measures.18 The evidence shows the development and production, in international settings, 
of anti-corruption documents and a parallel growing academic attention to anti-corruption 
issues. In the ‘90s, the ‘good governance’ discourse arose in opposition to ‘corruption’ firstly 
in Third Countries economies: they were tied to Western Countries by aid specifications. 
Indeed, the institutional design, as pointed out by Andersson and Heywood (2009: 750) ‘(…) 
                                                             
18 The history of anti-corruption concerns assumed a great emphasis after the Cold War. It became, translating a 
definition of government by Rose and Miller, a ‘problematizing activity’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 181). From the 
decolonization process, in the second half of XX Century, the relations between the Developed World and Third 
World countries, using the wording of that time, were multiple and sustained by foreign aids. ‘But when the Cold 
War came to a close, so did the blanket tolerance for corruption. Corruption could now be confronted without 
threatening the loss of an ally’ with reference to Third World dictators (Wedel, 2012: 460). 
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has been intimately linked with the idea of promoting ‘good governance’ as a means of 
combatting corruption’. International institutions strategies represent a sort of ‘anti-
corruption industry’ (Kerkhoff and Wagenaar, 2015). As emphasised by Bukovansky, despite 
the diffusion of ‘ethical terms and references to good governance’ in pivotal anti-corruption 
documents of (international) institutions and academic discourses, ‘the dominant rational for 
the anti-corruption consensus has been economic, and to a lesser extent institutional (…), 
rather than normative (…).” (Bukovansky, 2006: 194).  
A distinction arises in Bukovansky’s work between the republican and the liberal discourse. In 
particular, she outlines the shift from a traditional political morality, sustained in the 
republican discourse, and the role of institutions in the liberal – rationalist discourse about 
corruption. Bukovansky explains furthermore that: 
 
‘the republican discourse thus offers a richer and more resonant conception of corruption 
than does liberal-rationalist discourse. Richer, in its conception of institution as organic 
entities whose norms are capable of being internalized, and which are capable of evoking 
emotional attachment and moral commitment, rather than merely exogenous incentive 
structures channeling the activity of narrowly self-interested actors. (…) More resonant, in 
that it evokes the human capacity for moral agency in civil life.’ (Bukovansky, 2006: 202).  
 
Summarizing, when the republican discourse shifted in a more institutionalized way, the 
liberal discourse augmented its appeal.  
We can hypothesize that, when corruption becomes a technical concern, the distance with 
moral issue increases - as well as its perception. Is it possible to observe this shift in Italy during 
the last economic crisis? To understand the shift from a moral concept (or discourse) to a 
technical implementation of anti-corruption efforts, it is necessary to observe the changes in 
government programmes. 
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2. The translation  
The multiple centres of calculation are subjects and objects that compose the realm of 
designs: the programmatic ‘is the realm of designs put forward by philosophers, political 
economists, physiocrats and philanthropists, government reports, committees of inquiry, 
White Papers, proposals and counterproposals, that seek to configure specific locales and 
relations in ways thought desirable’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 181).  
The space where the programmes are formulated is a widespread system (of power) which 
involves the (not exclusively institutional) actors included in the translation process. For 
clarity, the levels and centres can be synthetically (and not exhaustively) classified as follows:  
(a) international and regional organization, (b) national level decision-makers, (c) 
organizational levels. The present work considers levels (a) and (b) with attention to Italian 
case. In relevant literature, another level is represented by civil society. We quote for 
completeness but we not include in the translation process as ‘level’ but rather as recipient. 
Indeed, the anti-corruption conceptual approach, as Moroff and Schimdt-Pfister outline, is 
normally framed between two levels: national government (that is national level decision-
makers) and international society (that is international and regional organizations). They 
suggest ‘(…) to adjust the general conceptual approach of studying anti-corruption efforts by 
moving from two to three levels of analysis: the levels of domestic civil society, national 
government, and international society’ (Moroff and Schimdt-Pfister, 2010: 92). The 
formulation of programmes of government stems from the programmatic realm through the 
different levels. Along these levels and in-between, we can distinguish the multiples centres 
of calculation. Levels and centres of calculation usually overlap.  
2.1 The role of international and regional organizations  
The commitment to reform Italy seems essential in the discourse of international 
organizations, like the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2012b).19 The structural reform process includes for instance market labour reform, fiscal 
consolidation, simplification and schedules the Italian anti-corruption bill. Before the 
enactment of Italian Law No.190 in 2012, the strengthening of public sector integrity 
represented a key point of the reform mechanism. The OECD (2012a) provided policy 
                                                             
19 See Speech of OECD Secretary-General. 
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recommendations to Italy challenging a ‘reviving growth and productivity’ for the country. 
Indeed, the Organization highlights that among ‘OECD countries, Italy has a high level of 
perceived corruption (…), and indicators show a negative trend in the perception of corruption 
in Italy from 2008 to 2011, a gap confirmed by other available data’ (Organization for 
Economic Co-peration and Development, 2012a: 19). During the biennium 2011-2012, as 
pointed out by Canestri, ‘three in depth evaluations were conducted by international experts 
on the Italian anti-bribery system’ (Canestri, 2014: 265). In May 2011, a Compliance Report 
about Italy was drawn up by the Group of States against Corruption instituted within the 
Council of Europe (GRECO). It showed relatively few progresses in the Italian anti-corruption 
system and called of a more consistent implementation. During the biennium 2011-2012 the 
results of international pressure became evident.  
This progressive change started at least 15 years before in the international panorama. 
GRECO, established in 1999 by the Council of Europe, aims to enhance the capacity of its 
members to fight corruption.20 In 2008, GRECO, in an Evaluation Report adopted in 2009 by 
the plenary meeting of the Group, asked the Italian competent authorities ‘to develop and 
publicly articulate an anti-corruption policy that takes into consideration the prevention, 
detection, investigation and prosecution of corruption, and provides for monitoring and 
assessment of its effectiveness.’ (Council of Europe, 2009: 58).   
The 2011 GRECO Compliance Report concerning Italy stressed a new anti-corruption legal 
framework which, if adopted, should facilitate anti-corruption coordinated actions. 
Furthermore, GRECO observed that regrettably ‘certain areas have received no or insufficient 
attention so far, notably, with respect to, inter alia, the adoption of codes of conduct for 
members of the Government, the prevention of conflicts of interest, the protection of whistle-
blowers, and the strengthening of anti-corruption provisions in the private sector.’ (Council of 
Europe, 2011: 24). 
In-between evaluations and recommendations, Italy ratified in 2009 the United Nations (UN) 
Convention against Corruption adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2003 (United Nations, 
2003). Italy absorbed in its domestic normative system, as anticipated by this international 
                                                             
20 Through evaluation mechanisms and peer reviews it wanted to identify gaps in anti-corruption policies and to 
fix them. Currently its members include 48 European States and the United States of America. Italy joined GRECO 
in June 2007. 
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treaty and other international documents, the need for Codes of Conduct for public officials.  
The mentioned UN Convention, as well as documents by GRECO, highlight the promotion of 
integrity among public officials (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
1998, 2000; United Nations, 2003; Council of Europe, 2009).21 Rules were written and 
principles were translated in Codes of Ethics and Conduct. 
2.2 The perception index 
The shift from the ‘First’ to the ‘Second Republic’ was marked by outrage in public opinion; 
the shift to a technical government in 2011 was heralded by a deep economic crisis. The 
government mandate was twofold: ‘to help restore growth and prod Europe to find a more 
comprehensive solution to the debt crisis’ (Donadio and Povoledo, 2011). 
Before 2012, the spread between Italian and German bonds became an index of confidence, 
the corruption perception a score to fix and, ‘austerity’ measures (Fonte, 2011) the solution 
against a deep crisis which constantly recalled the Greek failure within the European Union 
system. In the ‘90s, technocratic governments were appointed in Italy to support political 
parties while they approached some overall reforms.  As pointed out by Culpepper, the 
government appointed in 2011 ‘(…) tried to develop policies autonomously, with little 
consultation of unions, organized employers, or political parties.’ (Culpepper, 2014: 1265).    
The prelude of this technical government was heralded by higher levels of perceived 
corruption.  A wide discourse about corruption was promoted and supported by data.  
In 2011, Transparency International registered in Italy a higher Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI): 3,9 in a range from 0 (‘highly corrupt’ countries) to 10 (‘very clean’ countries) as also 
described by the Italian newspaper Il Sole 24 ore (Transparency International, 2011a; Il Sole 
24 Ore, 2011). As pointed out by Transparency International (2011b), the 2011 CPI ‘draws on 
17 data sources from 13 institutions. The information used for the 2011 CPI is survey data 
from these sources gathered between December 2009 and September 2011. The CPI includes 
only sources that provide a score for a set of countries/territories and which measure 
perceptions of corruption in the public sector.’ In 2009 the Italian CPI score was 4.3 (Natoli, 
2010).   
                                                             
21 In addition, the OECD (2010) fostered a culture of integrity in the 2010 Recommendation of the Council on 
Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying. 
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The resulting data is the average score for Italy’s National Integrity System, that is 55.04% in 
a range from 0 (the lowest or the worst) to 100 (the highest or the best). This was the data 
presented in 2012 by Transparency International Italia when reviewing the period from 2010 
to 2011 (Segato et al., 2012). This picture of Italy showed a problematic country. As 
Sargiacomo et al. outline, starting from 2009 ‘the anticorruption policy and practices were re-
framed as being part of the campaign against “maladministration”.’ (Sargiacomo et al., 2015: 
94). A Commission for the evaluation, transparency and integrity in Public Administration 
(CIVIT) was established in 2009. 22 
As mentioned, the new Italian technical government sworn in November 2011 was born on 
expectations of, also moral, renewal (Forte, 2012). A Commission appointed by the same 
technical Government on corruption matters held its first meeting in January 2012 (Italy, 
Presidency of Council of Ministers, 2012).23 The mandate of the Commission was twofold: on 
the one hand, it should present some improvements (amendments) to anti-corruption 
legislation to reinforce the measures against corruption. On the other, it was to prepare a 
report on anti-corruption issue, in order to identify policies and (general and sectorial) 
modalities to prevent corruption in the public sector. The Report represents one of the 
meaningful documents describing the corruption distribution, based on the evidence from 
judicial data, perceptions and qualitative data. It outlines the change of corruption 
phenomena over time, the corruption costs and the international context: it was a 
comprehensive (absorptive) document about translation mechanisms including some relevant 
proposals.24 The Commission work considered the moral issue not a merely technical concern 
that could be solved with managerial tools, nor a simple judicial problem to be repressed. It 
explained that corruption was less extended in so far as personal convictions and social circles 
of identification supported a system of values as an element that supported compliance with 
the law (Italy, Presidency of Council of Ministers, 2012). Indeed, the diffusion of corruptive 
                                                             
22 CIVIT, Commissione indipendente per la valutazione, la trasparenza e l’integrità delle amministrazioni 
pubbliche. 
23 Commissione per lo studio e l’elaborazione delle proposte in tema di trasparenza e prevenzione della corruzione 
nella pubblica amministrazione. 
24 The Report outlines the metamorphosis of corruption and the need for integrated policies to tackle it and 
explains the phenomenon under an economic perspective, grounded in the literature, and counterbalanced by 
the socio-cultural dimension. 
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facts is less likely where there are high moral standards and a positive perception of the State 
by civil servants (Italy, Presidency of Council of Ministers, 2012). Looking at the international 
discourse (not the international recommendations or the international pressure) of anti-
corruption policies makes ethical issue emerge. Ethical concerns, mainly moulded in 
international contexts of integrity management, are connected to the Code of conduct of 
public officers.  
The strengthening of this ethical system by law seems confirmed by further policy 
developments. A technical implementation could thus be observed: the ethical concept was 
managerialized in a stronger form in the Codes of Conduct. However, the translation process 
presented in this Report does not represent a complete shift to a technical dimension of anti-
corruption policies and mechanisms.      
In November 2012, Italian Law No. 190 for the prevention and repression of corruption in 
Public Administration entered into force (Italy, Parliament, 2012). In September 2013, the 
Italian National Anti-corruption Authority approved the Anti-corruption National Plan in 
accordance with anti-corruption laws (Italy, Anti - Corruption National Authority, 2013).  This 
Plan, with the strategical purpose of preventing corruption at central level, defines the main 
elements (including managerial tools) for the Public Administration to articulate a ‘three-year 
plan for corruption prevention’. 25 
 
3. Anti-corruption as a government programme: local practices  
The first version of the Anti-corruption national plan, approved in 2013, describes the 
measures for corruption prevention: at central level there is a National Anti-corruption plan, 
at decentered level, each Public Administration defines a ‘three-year anti-corruption plan’. In 
accordance with these recommendations, the three-year anti-corruption plan of a Region 
contains the evaluation of specific corruption risks and a strategy for corruption prevention.  
The national programme included, in premises, a feed – back mechanism: the system should 
guarantee a return of information from de-centered Public Administration to improve the 
Plan. The results contribute to the sophistication and implementation of better measures to 
fight corruption in Public Administration.    
                                                             
25 Further normative contents updated the Anti-corruption national plan. 
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The 7 October 2013, the Responsible of transparency and corruption prevention (Responsible) 
of Friuli Venezia Giulia Autonomous Region (FVG) was appointed (Friuli Venezia Giulia 
Autonomous Region, 2013a). The Responsible is a Director with special functions, assigned to 
this position after thirty – years of service in the regional administration and confirmed once 
again at the end of 2014 (Agenzia Quotidiana di Stampa Regione Cronache, 2014g). The first 
deadline for the three-year anti-corruption plan was fixed at national level on 31 January 2014. 
‘The term was dramatically close’ states the Responsible during an interview (Interview with 
Mauro Vigini, Responsible of transparency and corruption prevention, 16 April 2016. pers. 
comm.). 26  
The first three – year anti-corruption plan has been produced in the ‘better possible way’ in 
accordance with the timelines established by law (Interview with Mauro Vigini, Responsible 
of transparency and corruption prevention, 16 April 2016. pers. comm.). The new regional 
Office, led by the Responsible, elaborated a map of risks as stated by the National Anti-
corruption Plan and its up-dated version (the technical follow-up of the Italian Law No. 
190/2012).  
The regional plan included a Code of Conduct for the civil servants of the Region and a three-
year programme for integrity and transparency (Friuli Venezia Giulia Autonomous Region, 
2014: 4). It represented a programmatic document and a managerial instrument. It contained 
evaluation sheets that highlight the corruption exposition risks of regional processes as well 
as the evaluation of specific risks for each process. It proposed general and specific measures 
to reduce the risks (Friuli Venezia Giulia Autonomous Region, 2014).  
Is there a compliance attitude or a strategy for the development of this programme?  
The anti-corruption policy at regional level considers the de-personalization and the re-
engineerization of processes. Therefore, the risk of corruption and the de-personalized 
processes are related?  
‘Is the first time that someone ask me this kind of question, but I can surely reply yes!’ 
responds the Responsible. ‘We could combine technical competences and procedures as 
standardized and aseptic as possible. The safer process gives less space to officer extemporary 
                                                             
26 The interviews with the Responsible of transparency and corruption prevention has been held in his Office in 
Trieste (FVG) the 4 April 2016 (personal and private interview) and the 16 April 2016 (private interview).   
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initiatives. (…) For instance, if we receive a grant request and we have a protocol, a procedure 
for this document (…) and in particular we are aware of the time to treat it (…) we are creating 
a safe procedure against corruption.’ (Interview with Mauro Vigini, Responsible of 
transparency and corruption prevention, 16 April 2016. pers. comm.). 
3.1 The public and political consistency of Anti-corruption Office  
The analysis of press releases delivered by the regional press office of FVG Region (Agenzia 
Quotidiana di Stampa Regione Cronache) outlines the consistency given by political 
representatives to anti-corruption Office. In particular, how corruption and transparency 
problems are publicly managed.27  
The first time that the Office has been mentioned date back to mid-October 2013: the 
Responsible was charged to lead the Office. The President of the Region, during a meeting 
with the President of the Court of Auditors of FVG, mentioned the Office (Agenzia Quotidiana 
di Stampa Regione Cronache, 2013a).  
One month later, during a conference about the ‘new’ national anti-corruption law, especially 
addressed to local administrators, the regional Councillor of Public Function (a member of the 
regional executive body) outlined the importance of the anti-corruption training. The Region 
assumed the task to assure, in cooperation with Local Autonomies, the governance and the 
founding of ‘this lever of strategic training’ as stated by the Councillor (Agenzia Quotidiana di 
Stampa Regione Cronache, 2013b). 
In 2014, at the end of January, the President of the Region announced that the regional 
executive body approved the first anti-corruption plan, quoting indirectly the work of the 
Office. The President of FVG explained that the anti-corruption plan includes the Code of 
conduct for regional officers and the Programme for integrity and transparency. It has three-
year duration with the possibility to be up-dated yearly and modified if necessary (Agenzia 
Quotidiana di Stampa Regione Cronache, 2014a). 
                                                             
27 The press releases have been screened using the research engine provided by the institutional web site of the 
Region. The key words used are ‘anticorruzione’ (anticorruption) and ‘prevenzione’ plus ‘corruzione’ (‘corruption’ 
plus ‘prevention’). The timeline (October 2013 – July 2016) starts from the establishment of the regional anti-
corruption and prevention Office.      
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Other Councillors mentioned the anti-corruption strategy of FVG, especially in sensible areas 
like the procurement sector (public works) and local police (Agenzia Quotidiana di Stampa 
Regione Cronache, 2014b; 2015a). 
At the beginning of 2014, less than six months from the appointment of the Responsible, the 
‘transparency’ theme became a central issue. The regional government opposition outlined a 
low performance (compared to other Italian Regions) in terms of institutional website 
transparency. The Responsible, without a political mediation, replied to opposition critiques 
(Agenzia Quotidiana di Stampa Regione Cronache, 2014c; 2014d). 
In March 2014, FVG Region proposed at the Conference of Regions the institutionalization of 
a national round table, a sort of coordination instrument between each regional anti-
corruption responsible.28 As explained by the regional Councillor of Finance, the aim is to treat 
the most critical issues about corruption presenting the results at central level (Agenzia 
Quotidiana di Stampa Regione Cronache, 2014e).  
The declarations of the President of FVG and her Deputy underline the relation with the 
national level, and in particular with the President of the Italian Anticorruption Authority 
(Agenzia Quotidiana di Stampa Regione Cronache, 2014f; 2015b).29,30 The President of the 
Anticorruption Authority visited the Region in November 2015 (Agenzia Quotidiana di Stampa 
Regione Cronache, 2015c).  
Finally, the President of FVG, discussing the importance for the centralization procurements 
(Agenzia Quotidiana di Stampa Regione Cronache, 2016), recalled the corruption matter, but 
not the Office. 
What is the relation between the Director and the main political representatives of the 
Region?  
The Director reports to regional executive body two or more times per year about the 
transparency and anti-corruption activities. He directly depends to the President of the Region 
                                                             
28 The Conference of Regions (Conferenza delle Regioni) was instituted in 1981 and is a political body for the 
coordination of the Presidents of Italian Regions and Autonomous Provinces. 
29 This can be explained by political internal factors as well as by imposing public works (namely regional 
infrastructures and the port recovery) which need strong preventive anti-corruption measures.   
30 Agenzia Nazionale Anticorruzione or ANAC.  
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and interacts with her. ‘Usually I use reminders’ adds the Responsible ‘there are intense 
phases and others less demanding’. However, the support demonstrated by the President is 
‘total’, concludes the Responsible (Interview with Mauro Vigini, Responsible of transparency 
and corruption prevention, 16 April 2016. pers. comm.).  
 
4. Compliance and bureaucratization 
In 2014, the first three-year anticorruption plan presented the map of risks as in the successive 
versions (Friuli Venezia Giulia Autonomous Region, 2014a; 2015a; 2016). Yearly, the 
Responsible is entrusted to present a report resuming the anti-corruption policy development 
revising risks (Friuli Venezia Giulia Autonomous Region, 2014b; 2015b).  
At the beginning of 2016, the compulsory anti-corruption practice progressively led to a new 
managerial development: the idea is to trace all regional processes to reduce their 
redundancy. This includes all the regional processes, not only those under alleged corruption 
risk. 
During the spring of the same year, the Responsible, supported by the General Director of the 
Region, created an informal group composed by 18 regional public officers coming from 
different regional Departments. They were charged to become a sort of ‘changing factor’. This 
strategy is a projection for 2016-2017.  
‘Could you explain me what do you mean by changing factor?’ is the question directed to the 
Responsible during the personal interview. ‘The national anti-corruption plan and its 2015 up-
dated version (…) assumes that the Public Administration provides a map of processes for a 
seriously policy against corruption. Let’s say: the anti-corruption model is that of ISO31000 of 
2009.31 Essentially, it means that we have to activate a corruption prevention policy: 
preventing, anticipating and diminishing the corruption phenomenon. 
The Responsible outlines that, in accordance with the European anti-corruption trend (for 
instance France or Great Britain or Slovenia) the strategy is based on defined process-forms 
that analyse the exposure and seriousness of corruption risk.  ‘Indeed, our anti-corruption 
plan’ explains the Responsible ‘is based on this four-five points. A map of processes, the 
                                                             
31 ISO31000:2009 provides principles and processes for managing risk. Internationally recognised benchmark 
are used for the analysis of risk management practices.  
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evaluation, the identification and the treatment.’ (Interview with Mauro Vigini, Responsible 
of transparency and corruption prevention, 16 April 2016. pers. comm.). 
The ‘bureaucratization expansion’ leads the first phase of the anti-corruption programme of 
government. New procedures of control and technologies of verification have been 
introduced.   
4.1 A managerial reform extent 
The forecasted map of the processes will include the entire regional administration.   
‘I’m part of the General Direction, as the colleagues of my Office, and we are all involved in 
the same match’ explains the Responsible. Quoting the General Director words, he explains 
the idea of a map of process for the Region ‘”Good! Since the Responsible of transparency and 
corruption prevention needs a map of processes in anti-corruption terms (…) let’s analyse the 
regional procedures and simplify them (…)”’. The idea became a project, supported by the 
results obtained in another Italian context, the Veneto Region.  
The project will become a strategical managerial tool to reduce the bureaucratization of 
procedures and to outline the differences between the different Directions. ‘I’m discussing in 
projection terms, this would be a historical result’ adds the Responsible. In addition, this 
activity will help the control of costs (of each unit) with the possibility to evaluate the 
exposition to corruption risk (Interview with Mauro Vigini, Responsible of transparency and 
corruption prevention, 16 April 2016. pers. comm.).   
In April 2016 the first training session took place. Public servants composed the group: some 
officers and staff directors plus the members of anti-corruption Office and the Responsible. 
The group includes a psychologist (internal) and the training staff (an academic and a 
practitioner). The first session was open by an informal speech of the General Director of the 
Region.32 The General Director supported the idea of a complete map of processes for the 
entire regional system. Although he forecasted some ‘resistances’ during re-engineerization 
mechanism.  
During the first day, the group explored the managerial framework and the tools provided by 
public management for the segmentation of processes. The second day (and the third) 
                                                             
32 The training session last three days: 20, 21 and 27 April 2016. The participatory observation analyses the 
meetings of 20 and 21 April 2016, FVG Region, Trieste.  
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practical examples were presented to involve the group. At the end of the second session, 
practical questions arose outlying the different professional backgrounds and functions of the 
officers involved in the managerial experiment. Practical examples underlined how difficult 
could be a ‘detailed’ examination of processes as well as the management of a heterogeneous 
group of civil servants (‘in my Office…’) dealing with different issues (‘however this procedure 
is different…’).  
Is the corruption a problem of process standardization? The re-engineerization seems 
enhance the ‘safe’ procedure. Nevertheless, the corruption contains moral implications (Kant, 
2014).  
 
5. The integrity (culture) 
After the enactment of the Italian Law No. 190/2012, periodical training courses for regional 
civil servants have been promoted in FVG. ‘Due to my knowledge of the administration, and I 
know it from the 80s’, we have a strong culture of legitimacy. With culture of legality, we refer 
to behaviors not unlawful, and this is take for granted. Beyond we have a culture of legitimacy 
(…) that means writing administrative acts in compliance with law. Whereas, in the Public 
Administration there is also a culture of integrity. Until few years ago, the culture of legitimacy 
was sufficient’ argues the Responsible.  
Legality, legitimacy and integrity refer to the same battle against corruption but the question 
‘what’s about the moral issue? What’s about the moral issue of 80s’ (…)?’ encourages a deeper 
reflection.33   
 ‘With morality I refer to my private and personal sphere of values and no one can intervene’ 
replies the Responsible. The explication denotes a forethought about the theme ‘we can work 
on ethics, we can make an effort to identify rational values not supra natural that could be 
shared and could be asked by the Administration to the officers [last word added by the 
interviewer]. This can be more or less challenging’ (Interview with Mauro Vigini, Responsible 
of transparency and corruption prevention, 16 April 2016. pers. comm.).  
                                                             
33 At the beginning of 80s’ in Italy, the moral issue mainly outlined the need of reviewing the relation between 
the political parties and the Public Administration. 
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The international principles for managing ethics in the public service reflect this approach. The 
ethical discourse is not negative but positive: it does not work on prohibition but on 
challenges.  
In 1998, a recommendation of the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation 
promotes the principles for managing ethics in the public services. It highlights how 
government should concentrate on values and precisely ‘(M)anagement policies and practices 
should demonstrate an organisation's commitment to ethical standards. It is not sufficient for 
governments to have only rule-based or compliance-based structures. Compliance systems 
alone can inadvertently encourage some public servants simply to function on the edge of 
misconduct, arguing that if they are not violating the law they are acting ethically. Government 
policy should not only delineate the minimal standards below which a government official's 
actions will not be tolerated, but also clearly articulate a set of public service values that 
employees should aspire to.’ (Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation, 
1998: 9).   
Behind these values, which can be called integrity or ethic principles, there is also a matter of 
‘prestige’ accorded to the public officer by the function covered. This ‘prestige’ perception - 
as the historical path of morality and legitimacy - has profoundly change during the years. ‘In 
1985 no one need to tell me that I can’t steal the paper for the photocopier. In 2016, the 
discourse mainly concerns collaboration between offices, motivation, identification with the 
institution, in particular for regional directors. (…) Norms works on a superficial ground, values 
at behavioral level not at belief level’. About the rational intention to set up a non-subjective 
morality the behavioral aptitude can be expressed, according to the Responsible, with this 
paraphrase ‘I’m working good not because I’m convinced to not steal but because I’m working 
in a community of values’ (Interview with Mauro Vigini, Responsible of transparency and 
corruption prevention, 16 April 2016. pers. comm.). 
 
6. Technicalities of ethic in a moral country 
In Italy, the moral issue has political roots that marked progressively during the ‘80s and ‘90s 
the need of a tidy distinction between political parties and Public Administration, between 
private interest and public function. Proposed with different consistency from time to time, 
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this political rationality (the moral issue) sustained the crosscutting political parties discourse 
between legality and corruption.   
In the meantime, the cultural change within the Public Administration passed through the shift 
from a ‘culture of legality’ to a ‘culture of legitimacy’ until a ‘culture of integrity’. New 
managerial instruments have been introduced simultaneously with these new cultural-ethical 
standards. These technicalities of ethic provide in a technical way, not in a political form, the 
new architecture of corruption prevention. In particular, the technicalities of ethic refine the 
edges of values that can be ask to civil servants.   
These do not affect the private and personal sphere of values. They refer to ‘ethics’ not 
expressly to ‘morality’. Gebel, describing the anti-corruption discourse of Transparency 
International defines ethics and integrity ‘(…) “ethics” do not mean any more than the rules 
and incentives that are formally set for public offices, institutions and business, whereas 
“integrity” does not mean any more than behavior according to those rules. The “moral 
elements” in [International Anti-corruption] discourse are just words that make it sound better 
because of their positive connotation.’ (Gebel, 2012: 123).  
The moral issue, on which the main anti-corruption discourse has been constructed during the 
time, seems ‘isolated’ as a subjective matter. It is externalized from the managerial sphere 
and substituted with technical concepts of ethics and integrity.   
 
7. Conclusions and future research 
The neo-liberal economy, in ‘90s, promoted the anti-corruption discourse and its 
‘industrialization’. This definition of reality was supported by the ‘good governance’ concepts, 
the transparency reasons and the performative transformation of Public Administration. Anti–
corruption issues became a programme of government enacted through a translation 
between different centres of calculation, verification and control.  
In Italy, normative and comprehensive documents allowed a gradual introduction of 
managerial measures to fight corruption in compliance with international standards. In a 
period of political disaffection and economic crisis, the compliance process represented a sort 
of unavoidable ‘reformatory’ effort requested by external actors, the regional and 
international organizations. This pressure leads to the introduction of new technicalities. 
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Ideally, these managerial instruments allow the corruption prevention, control and 
specification through the collection and ‘inscription’ of information, knowledge and data.  
At the same time and, at least from 2011, we can observe a progressive shift from the moral 
form of political rationality to a technical dimension of the anti-corruption programme of 
government. A sort of compliance mechanism leads the ‘reformatory effort’, not the moral 
form.  
 
The internationally ‘corrective’ pressure and the national compliance produce effects in local 
practices. The FVG empirical context shows the introduction of compulsory managerial 
instruments in line with the normative mechanism underling: 1) the expansion of 
bureaucratization, (2) the internalization of aseptic codes of conduct and ethics despite the 
political rationalities – mainly moral – on which these have been constructed and, (3) the 
isolation of ‘morality’ as an individual matter instead of a common-public value. Nevertheless, 
in this case, the unavoidable expansion of bureaucratization enables a re-examination of 
processes that involves the entire Region.  
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